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Legal Regimes and Political Particularism: An
Assessment of the “Legal Families” Theory from the
Perspectives of Comparative Law and Political
Economy
John W. Cioffi
ABSTRACT: The “legal families” theory of corporate law and
ownership structures pioneered by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny provides one of the most
influential accounts of why “law matters” in shaping economic
organization and outcomes. However, the empirical bases and
theoretical logic of the theory contain serious flaws and limitations.
First, as has been pointed out by a number of critics engaged in this
revision, the legal origins literature contains numerous problematic
characterizations of substantive law that expose the serious problems of
quantitative operationalization of legal rules as a mode of comparative
legal analysis. Second, the econometrics analysis of broad, cross-national
patterns of legal and financial system characteristics departs from the
theoretical and practical concerns of law as an academic and
professional discipline focused on intra-systemic behavior. Third, the
legal families theory is essentially an underspecified, path-dependent
account of political economic development that is, at the very least, in
logical tension with observable changes in law and financial system
structures of both the past and present. Fourth, the methodology does not
adequately distinguish between countries in which the rule of law and
functional political and legal institutions are well-established
(generally the advanced industrial countries) and those in which they
are not (generally less developed countries (LDCs), often with
significant post-colonial legacies). Given these flaws in, and limitations
of, the legal families theory, the intuitively appealing thesis that law
matters must be resituated in a more empirically persuasive and
historically sensitive account of the relationship between law and
politics. I speculate that any meaningful correlation between legal
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origins and economic outcomes is the product of politics in the first
instance rather than law, and that legal families likely function as a
proxy for different forms of political economic organization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The “legal origins” (or “legal families”) theory of corporate law
and ownership structures pioneered by Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (LLSV) has
become one of most influential accounts of why “law matters” to
economic organization and outcomes.1 The literature written and
inspired by LLSV seeks to explain significant variations in the
ownership structures and financial market development of a wide
range of countries around the world and has grown vastly in size and
complexity. Their core contentions are well-known: legal systems
around the world are largely derived from a discrete set of “legal
families” and these origins have had a substantial and systematic
influence on current national legal and, thus, financial structures.
Anglo-American common law origins are associated with stronger
minority shareholder protections and disclosure rules, and higher
levels of equity finance. They are also correlated with dispersion of
shareholding, the separation of ownership and control, securities
market development, and higher rates of economic growth.
Scandinavian, German, and French civil law traditions are generally
correlated, in descending order, with weaker shareholder
protections, greater financial opacity and opportunities for insider
rent-seeking, and lower scores on economic outcome measures.

1. For LLSV’s direct contributions to this literature, see Rafael La Porta et al.,
Government Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265 (2002); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor
Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002) [hereinafter La Porta et al.,
Investor Protection]; Rafael La Porta et al., Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the
World, 55 J. FIN. 1 (2000); Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54
J. FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
222 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Quality of Government]; Rafael La Porta et al., Law
and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance];
Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); see also
Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430 (2008);
Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285
(2008) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Economic Consequences of Legal Origins]; Rafael La Porta et
al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) [hereinafter La Porta et al., What
Works in Securities Laws?]; Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL.
ECON. 445 (2004); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance,
52 J. FIN. 737 (1997).
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However, the theoretical logic and empirical bases of the legal
origins theory have been subjected to withering criticism. The theory
resurrected the problematic distinction between common and civil
law traditions—long dismissed by many comparative legal scholars as
over-simplified and a misrepresentation of how legal systems actually
work—and presented the distinction as an important determinant of
economic organization, financial development, and growth. It
appealed to the intuitive belief that both history (including colonial
legacies) and law matter in the course and relative success of
economic development. It did so, however, by greatly simplifying
the characterization of historical and juridical phenomena. On a
more practical and policy-oriented level, the theory and the literature
it spawned privileged finance—and market-driven finance in
particular—within the wider terrain of political economic ordering
and effectively promoted pro-shareholder and market enabling legal
mechanisms as crucial foundations for the growth of equity finance,
the dispersion of shareholding, and growth of the broader financial
system and economic development.2 The pro-finance ideological and
policy thrust of this literature came at a time when financial crises
were recurrent and increasingly serious. Now, these financial crises
have culminated in a global financial collapse and a worldwide Great
Recession.
I review four crucial weaknesses of the legal origins literature
from the perspective of comparative law and political economy.3
First, commentators have criticized the LLSV work for numerous
problematic or erroneous characterizations of substantive law that
indicate serious problems of quantitative operationalization.4 These
issues of characterization and coding of legal rules remain
contentious and difficult to resolve. The challenges become even

2. In this sense, the legal origins theory, as an application of neo-classical microeconomics, lends itself to policy prescriptions supported by comparative statics. LLSV,
however, generally leave these implications oblique and hedged by their acknowledgement that
there is no single optimal juridical governance regime.
3. By “comparative political economy,” I refer to the study of the systemic
interrelations between political power and institutions, and economic organization and
practices. This conception of political economy is entirely distinct from the definition of the
term as the use of economic theory and methods to study political phenomenon (though it by
no means precludes the use of such approaches), a prominent example of which is the legal
families literature itself.
4. See, e.g., Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric
Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17 (2007).
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greater when one seeks to account for changes in legal concepts,
norms, and rules over time.
Second, these problems of measurement point to deeper and
more intractable theoretical and practical criticisms of the legal
origins theory. Measurement difficulties implicate issues that go
beyond methodological concerns to the theoretical logic and
substantive understanding of law, economic organization, and
political economy. Difficulties in operationalizing legal and political
characteristics into useful quantitative variables not only call the
empirical findings into question, they also raise serious doubts about
the appropriateness of large-n quantitative methodology in the study
of legal rules and institutions as a mode of comparative legal analysis.
The reduction of complex legal provisions, their even more complex
interaction effects, and mechanisms (and effectiveness) of
enforcement to numerical form is at best extremely difficult; at
worst, it distorts available data in ways that undermine findings at the
levels of individual country cases and of broader comparative analysis.
Third, the legal families theory presents an exceedingly and
problematically deterministic and path dependent view of law,
institutions, and economic performance. The theory maintains that
legal structures are path dependent and have a predictable long-term
influence on economic behavior. It follows that the theory depends
empirically on the continuity of both legal and corporate ownership
structures. However, the historical record casts doubt on the
continuity of country-level stock ownership patterns and national
legal frameworks, let alone on the relationship between the two. As
Rajan and Zingales have shown, economic history contains a number
of “great reversals” in financial system organization and shareholding
patterns. While national economies cannot change the origin of their
legal system, in some cases they have shifted between a market-based
and bank-based financial system, and between diffuse and
concentrated shareholding structures, while it could not change the
origin of its legal system.5 Conversely, more recent sweeping reforms
of financial market regulation and corporate governance around the
world in the last two decades (and likely to accelerate in the near
future) substantially undermine a theoretical argument based on path

5. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial
Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003).
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dependence and call into question many of the LLSV measures and
codings.
Fourth, the legal origins theory does not adequately grapple with
the differences between countries in which the rule of law and
functional political and legal institutions are well-established
(generally the advanced industrial countries) and those in which they
are not (generally LDCs, which often have significant post-colonial
legacies). One of the most ambitious aspects of the LLSV enterprise
is its vast inclusiveness. But the same analytical approach, particularly
one that takes the operation of law and legal institutions as
fundamental in the causal analysis of economic outcomes, may not
be appropriate across the entire spectrum of countries as classified by
relative economic and/or institutional development. On the one
hand, one of the intuitively appealing features of legal origins theory
is that it purports to establish that “law matters” for economic
organization and outcomes. On the other hand, if legal origins
explain cross-national variation despite a large number of country
cases in which the rule of law and the functionality of legal
institutions is not, or is barely, established, it would seem to suggest
that law does not matter. If this is true, it must be something else
that matters.
This leads to a final speculation that, outside of the advanced
industrial nations where the rule of law and legal institutions are
generally well established, LLSV’s quantitative analyses—if they are
in fact measuring anything—are likely indirectly measuring political
differences rather than legal ones. The speculation is that the
characteristics of different legal families at the foundation of legal
origins theory reflect differences in political origins of states and
polities that have had an enduring effect on economic, and
particularly financial, development. Accordingly, the intuitively
appealing thesis that law matters must be resituated in a more
persuasive and historically sensitive account of the relationship
between law and politics. These considerations frame a counterhypothesis to the legal origins theory: any meaningful correlation
between legal families and economic outcomes is the product of
politics, in the first instance, rather than law. Legal families likely
function as a proxy for different forms of political economic
organization established by colonialism where they were imposed, or
as elective affinity where foreign legal and governance frameworks
were voluntarily adopted. The law-as-proxy relationship is
1505
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particularly likely where the rule of law has been and remains weak,
and where legal institutions are relatively underdeveloped and lack
autonomous capacity to articulate, apply, and enforce legal rules and
standards.
II. WHY LEGAL ORIGINS?
The legal families theory is one of the rare instances where
academic research has spawned a virtual cottage industry of scholars
from an array of fields and subfields working to extend or critique it.
This literature poses an initial question: Why has the theory become
so prominent and influential? A number of factors help explain why
the LLSV legal origins theory has become so visible and influential in
a wide range of academic disciplines and debates.
First, it speaks to a wide range of debates cutting across a vast
array of disciplines. The legal origins theory and analyses contributed
to the study of financial regulation, corporate governance regimes,
financial market development, ownership structures, state
intervention in the economy, corruption and the rule of law,
institutional capacity and development, and the relationships among
law, legal institutions, and economic growth. Scholars spanning the
fields of law, economics, management, political science, history,
sociology, and geography could benefit from engagement with this
body of work, giving it a large potential audience. But a potentially
large audience does not explain why it in fact developed. This leads
to a second important characteristic of the legal origins literature.
Legal origins theory has the intuitively and, perhaps just as
importantly, professionally appealing characteristic of contending
and adducing proof for the proposition that “law matters.” Not only
do legal structures have an important and enduring impact on
individual behavior, but legal history is also particularly important for
explaining significant variations in economic organization and
performance. The theory countered more doctrinaire versions of law
and economics that elevated the post-Coase, Jensen, and Meckling
contractualist paradigm and the private ordering of economic
relations to the position of first principles—and often to the status of
first and last policy prescriptions. Legal origins theory, emerging in
the mid-1990s heyday of neo-liberalism and globalization-inspired
convergence theories, pointed to a very different view of the role and
efficacy of law, and therefore of politics. This no doubt appeals to
many lawyers and legal scholars, who are quite naturally inclined to
1506
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think they study important and consequential, rather than
epiphenomenal and ineffectual, aspects of social life. It also resonates
with scholars and policy practitioners hailing from many disciplines
and professional positions who are not reconciled or are deeply
opposed to the absence of meaningful political and juridical agency
implied by deterministic social science theories and the frequently
laissez faire biases of much of law and economics.
However, the legal families theory remained firmly anchored in
neo-classical economic theory in an era in which the discipline and
theoretical apparatus of economics expanded its influence, empirical
reach, and scope of substantive concerns. It emerged during a period
(still ongoing despite a recent flurry of criticisms of academic
economics) in which other social science disciplines increasingly
appropriated the analytical framework of neo-classical economics and
the tools of econometric analysis. Whether welcomed and praised as
the harbinger of increasing theoretical and empirical rigor across the
social sciences, or denounced as a case of ideologically-driven
disciplinary imperialism, the undeniable fact is that, for better or
worse, in recent decades economics has become the dominant
intellectual current within the social sciences and policy circles.
Accordingly, LLSV and the legal families theory became an especially
visible example of a broader intellectual zeitgeist.
Further, the legal origins literature as developed by LLSV is an
extraordinary achievement regardless of one’s agreement with or
rejection of the theory or of their findings. The vast and
extraordinarily labor-intensive exercise of seeking to operationalize a
huge number of legal, economic, historical, and political variables,
use them to advance sophisticated modeling and quantitative
analysis, and do this for a large number of industrialized and
developing countries was—and remains—an exceptionally ambitious
undertaking. This complex methodology reflected and embodied the
trends across the social sciences, especially evident in political
science, toward large-n quantitative studies as the gold standard of
research and the increasing centrality of rational choice theories
based on economic theory in a widening range of disciplines.6 By the

6. See, e.g., GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994) (one of the most influential volumes on comparative
methodology in political science of the past thirty years and consistently advocating larger-n
studies as necessary to buttress the validity of findings and causal inferences); cf. COMPARATIVE
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (James Mahoney & Dietrich Reuschmeyer

IN
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1990s, large-n statistical analysis had become a principal, if not
dominant, method of social science research and approach to
comparative analysis. In legal academia, the legal origins theory
melded the growing influence of law and economics with the
growing interest in the interdisciplinary study of law and legal
institutions, even as it tended to provoke resistance from legal
scholars wedded to traditional modes of legal analysis and immersed
in the qualitative and discursive details of legal rules, doctrines, and
theories within particular national systems.
The LLSV legal families project also benefited from fortuitous
historical timing in a broader sense. The development of the legal
origins theory formed part of a great wave of academic research
related to the law, economics, and politics of financial systems, and
corporate governance gathered momentum. The economic
upheavals of the 1970s and 1980s precipitated a crisis of the postwar
economic order at national and international levels. The
manifestations of this crisis (or these crises) included the collapse of
the Bretton Woods international monetary regime, stagflation,
monetarism, deindustrialization, waves of mergers and acquisitions,
and an explosive growth of international financial markets. These
developments enhanced the structural power and economic
centrality of finance, and implicated structures and practices of
corporate governance as increasingly important to economic
performance and public policy. By the 1990s, the financialization of
the economy was not only a central dynamic of the liberal market
Anglo-American political economies, it was also a core structural
attribute of what was popularly (and loosely) identified as
globalization in which neo-liberalism and the American economic
model loomed as increasingly influential. This made the systematic
study of finance and its relationships to law and politics increasingly
important and attractive not only because it sought to understand
the economic order (or orders), but also because it attempted to
frame and empirically ground policy prescriptions in developed and
developing countries alike in a way that consistently favored the

eds., 2003) (presenting a competing methodological approach based on careful historical and
qualitative case study and small-n research); RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS,
SHARED STANDARDS (Henry E. Brady & David Collier eds., 2004) (staking out an
intermediate position between the quantitative, statistically-driven large-n methods and
qualitative, historically grounded approaches).
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adoption and facilitation of market-driven financial and economic
models.
The legal origins theory articulated in LLSV’s work emerged as
countries around the world began to reform their corporate
governance and financial systems to spur economic adjustment and
accommodate global financial flows. Countries pursued these goals
in an effort to achieve higher growth rates. LLSV supplied
policymakers with something often lacking in academic literature:
the basis for framing clear policy prescriptions. The legal families
theory purported to diagnose the juridical and institutional strengths
and ills of many economies, while simultaneously pointing to a set of
specific legal features and institutional arrangements conducive to
the dispersion of equity ownership, the development of financial
markets, and increased economic growth. The LLSV theory and
analysis of comparative corporate governance and its relationship to
relative economic success became highly influential not only within
the academy, but also beyond it in national and international policy
circles.7
In short, in many ways LLSV’s timing was ideal for their
extended foray into large-n econometric analysis of law and finance,
and propitious for finding a broad audience for what they had to say
and how they said it. However, as discussed below, the spread of
financial system and corporate governance reform also posed
problems for the legal origins theory. Ironically, legal reformers in
many countries used LLSV’s profoundly historically deterministic
model of legal and economic structures as an intellectual justification
for technocratic and often controversial structural reforms in
securities and company law. The very fact that these reforms
occurred undermined the deterministic and path dependent logic of
the legal origins theory.8 The acceleration of legal and institutional
change during an era of rapid financial globalization and neo-liberal

7. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 460, 463–64 (2006) (discussing the influence of the LLSV literature on
policymakers).
8. Cf. MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 166–67 (2006) [hereinafter ROE, POLITICAL
DETERMINANTS] (critiquing the reduction of highly politicized legal structures to technical
juridical fixes to technical economic problems).

1509

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/10/2010 12:48 PM

2009

reform made the path dependence of the legal origins theory appear
increasingly anachronistic and self-contradictory.9
Reform posed a set of practical and theoretical challenges. If the
legal origins theory was indeed correct, how could reform become so
prevalent, and could it be effective? The near ubiquity of legal reform
around the world underscored the paucity of politics in theories
based on economics. What were the political dynamics of reform?
How did reforms and antecedent rules and institutional
arrangements affect economic performance and outcomes? These
issues could not be captured in the correlational analysis and implicit
comparative statistics of the legal origins theory. And if legal reform
or financial system development could so rapidly shift in the
contemporary era, might they not have experienced other periods of
transformation in the past that would be inconsistent with the legal
origins theory? Further, the politics of reform—and its substance—in
the advanced industrial countries and in the developing and nondeveloping world could hardly be equated or analyzed in the same
way. The tasks of reforming legal regimes in countries with a long
tradition of the rule of law and well-established legal and regulatory
institutions is hardly comparable to political challenges of creating
legal regimes very nearly from scratch in less developed countries.
The reductionism of the LLSV treatment of legal rules as
quantitatively operationalized variables and the breadth of their
comparative analysis engendered substantial resistance by legal
scholars. Lawyers and legal scholars may have been amenable to the
finding that “law mattered” after all, but they typically have a far
more nuanced understanding of how legal rules, their interpretation
and application in practice, and enforcement mechanisms function as
part of the systemic whole.10 Further, the systems of primary concern
9. See Ruth Aguilera & Cynthia Williams, “Law and Finance”: Inaccurate, Incomplete,
and Important, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1413 (2009).
10. The “systemic whole,” in turn, can be conceptualized in multiple ways, ranging
from the legal system narrowly defined as the body of formal legal rules adopted in a
jurisdiction and the institutional means available for their interpretation, modification,
application, and enforcement to a more expansive view of the political economy that
encompasses political institutions, interest groups, social cleavages, forms of private economic
organization, and market structures. The former framing is common to legal scholarship,
which is understandably focused on legal rules and practices. The latter is the perspective
cultivated in the field of comparative political economy and perhaps most explicitly in the
“varieties of capitalism” literature. See, e.g., VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
Increasingly, scholars are attempting to integrate the analytical frameworks of comparative law
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to legal scholars and professionals are narrower in institutional,
jurisdictional, and political scope than the broad cross-national or
global scope of large-n studies. Stated in terms of Holmesian legal
realism, they are concerned with what courts (and other legal
institutions and decision makers) will in fact do—that is, they are
concerned with how legal rules will be used within the confines of a
specific jurisdictionally defined and institutionally bounded context.
The probability that country “X” will have a certain configuration of
laws and institutional arrangements given a certain independent
variable is distinct from the task of understanding the form and
operation of law and legal institutions in specific national or subnational cases. The way in which LLSV conceptualized legal rules
and institutions in quantitative analysis thus does not accord with
many lawyers’ and legal scholars’ understandings of how law works
in practice. Moreover, it also fails to comport with their
understandable focus on how legal rules are or are not enforced and
how these rules influence behavior within the jurisdictional and
institutional confines of particular legal systems. The LLSV use of
large-n econometric analysis and traditional legal analysis in many

and comparative political economy. See, e.g., JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE
POWER: THE COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN
THE AGE OF FINANCE CAPITALISM (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND
PRIVATE POWER]; PETER GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND
CORPORATE CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2005);
CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES
REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2008); YVES TIBERGHIEN,
ENTREPRENEURIAL STATES: REFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FRANCE, JAPAN, AND
KOREA (2007); Christopher A. Whytock, Taking Causality Seriously in Comparative
Constitutional Law: Insights from Comparative Politics and Comparative Political Economy, 41
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629 (2008). It is noteworthy that these works recognize the importance of
both law and politics as interacting elements of dynamic reform processes that are at once
highly particularistic, yet share common features. The pioneering work of Mark Roe also
bridged the study of law and political economy by explicating the historical and political
foundations of national corporate governance regimes and their impact on the diffusion of
shareholding and the separation of ownership and control. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE
(1994) [hereinafter ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS]; Mark J. Roe, Some
Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J.
1927 (1993) [hereinafter Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure]; Mark J. Roe, A
Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991) [hereinafter
Roe, Political Theory]; cf. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS, supra note 8 (developing an
analysis of comparative corporate governance based more on neo-classical principal-agent
theories of law and economics and statistical analysis, and less on historically grounded political
analysis).
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ways reflected different ontological commitments and practical
concerns.
III. MATH PROBLEMS—THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF LEGAL
RULES
Joining this critical push-back against the legal origins theory are
a number of economists and quantitatively-oriented scholars who
took issue with the LLSV coding of legal variables and thus with
their findings—both of which appear to display a consistent bias in
favor of common law systems and the liberal market (i.e., AngloAmerican) political economic model. A number of scholars have
criticized LLSV and the legal origins theory for improper
quantification of legal rules and concepts.11 These criticisms
undermine the very foundation of a fundamentally statistical
endeavor. Holger Spamann, for example, recently undertook to
systematically review and, where appropriate, revise the measures of
the legal variables LLSV used in their 1998 article Law and
Finance.12 Reexamining the coding for the variables in LLSV’s
influential “antidirector rights index” (ADRI), Spamann found that
thirty-three of forty-six measures needed to be changed. The
necessary changes resulted in a substantial diminution of
correlational results.13 The statistical significance of the common law-

11. See MARKUS BERNDT, GLOBAL DIFFERENCES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
SYSTEMS: THEORY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORMS 17–18 (2002); REINIER R. KRAAKMAN
ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
61 n.117 (2004); Udo C. Braendle, Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany—“Law
and Finance” Revisited, 7 GERMAN L.J. 257 (2006); Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in
Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30
DEL. J. CORP. L. 697 (2005); Luca Enriques, Do Corporate Law Judges Matter? Some Evidence
from Milan, 3 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 765, 779 n.43 (2002); Lele & Siems, supra note 4;
Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection Around the World (“Leximetric II”), 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 111 (2008).
12. Holger Spamann, ‘Law and Finance’ Revisited (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ.,
& Bus., Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 12, 2008); cf. La Porta et al., Law and
Finance, supra note 1, at 1126–28 (presenting the antidirector rights index).
13. Spamann, supra note 12, at 14. The ADRI variables quantify national law regarding
“one share, one vote,” “proxy by mail allowed,” “shares not blocked before the meeting,”
“cumulative voting,” “oppressed minorities mechanism,” “pre-emptive rights to new issues,”
“share capital required to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting,” and “mandatory
dividend.” Id. at 20. Joined by Simeon Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer have
developed an alternative to the ADRI, Djankov et al., supra note 1, at 432–33 (presenting an
anti-self-dealing index as the successor to the antidirector rights index), but this index has been
criticized as even more problematic as a metric of legal variables. See Lucian A. Bebchuk &
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civil law distinction disappeared with respect to the ADRI values or
correlations with stock market size and shareholder dispersion—the
two most important outcomes for the legal origins literature.14
Strikingly, using corrected ADRI values, the German legal family
scored the highest mean, followed by the Scandinavian, common
law, and French families, respectively.15 The rating of the quality of
shareholder protection under American law fell from five to two.16
Lele and Siems criticize LLSV both for coding/quantification
errors and, more importantly, for conceptualization problems that
result in a failure to adequately account for shareholder decisionmaking power, shareholder power to remove directors, board
composition, or director self-dealing.17 They suggest that the pattern
of omissions from the ADRI variables and the way in which they
were defined had a pronounced pro-U.S. bias that consistently
tended to raise the rating of American law and systematically lowered
the scores of countries, like Germany, that have different, though in
many ways effective, shareholder protections.18 Rejecting the LLSV
ADRI variable definitions and constructing an entirely new index
from sixty variables traced over thirty-five years for the United States,
United Kingdom, Germany, France, and India, Lele and Siems
found that shareholder protections improved for all countries over
the entire period.19 However, beginning in approximately 1985, the
United States became a notable laggard with its shareholder
protections virtually unchanged until the passage of the SarbanesOxley Act and related regulatory reforms following the Enron-era
corporate scandals.20 Even then, the United States was found to
provide the lowest level of protection of all the countries studied;
Germany and France, virtually indistinguishable, were found to
provide the highest.21 In a follow-up study extending the analysis to

Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263,
1279 n.54 and accompanying text (2009) (presenting criticisms of the anti-self-dealing index).
14. Spamann, supra note 12, at 15–17.
15. Id. at 14. Moreover, the French family’s lowest mean was not statistically significant.
Id.
16. Id.
17. Lele & Siems, supra note 4, at 18–21.
18. Id. at 20–21.
19. Id. at 30–35.
20. See id. at 31–32
21. Id. at 31 fig.1.

1513

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/10/2010 12:48 PM

2009

twenty countries, including more from the developing world, Siems
confirmed these findings and made the additional and surprising
finding that German law is far closer to the international mean than
the United States or the United Kingdom.22 Further, while many
countries, particularly China, had converged on German law as
measured by the index, the United States and United Kingdom had
diverged from it.23
Like the studies of LLSV before them, these studies do not, and
perhaps cannot, adequately address the issue of enforcement.
Enforcement is a notoriously difficult subject to study quantitatively,
but this difficulty makes it no less critical to the description and
assessment of a legal system.24 Part of the reason that enforcement is
difficult to quantify centers on the limitations of available data.25
Another reason for the difficulty lies in the inherent challenge of
measuring the different substantive and procedural elements that
affect enforcement rates and effectiveness along with the widely
varying forms of enforcement that coexist even within the same legal
and governance system. Spamann expressly notes that superior
enforcement mechanisms, both public and private, in the United
States likely compensate for the deficiencies of its substantive law.26 If
included in the analysis, this greater enforcement capacity would
presumably raise the rating of the effectiveness of shareholder
protection under the law in the United States. Lele and Siems do
include enforcement variables, but the definitions are derived entirely
from formal characteristics of the law and these are incomplete.27
They do not reflect, for instance, the differences in actual
enforcement rates and practices, particularly private litigation, crossnationally.28

22. Siems, supra note 11, at 144.
23. Id. at 132.
24. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 229 (2007).
25. Data on litigation rates, even for a country as developed and as litigious as the
United States, leaves much to be desired. Comparable cross-national data is virtually nonexistent.
26. See Spamann, supra note 12, at 18.
27. For example, they do not code for class-actions (or functionally analogous collective
actions), contingency fee arrangements, or critically important discovery rules and their
application in civil litigation. See Lele & Siems, supra note 4, at 22–25.
28. The high propensity for litigious enforcement in the United States compared to
other countries is treated at length in the literature on adversarial legalism. See, e.g., ROBERT A.
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These studies lead to a possibility, disquieting to those who place
hope in the efficacy of legal reform to alter and improve economic
performance, that law does not matter after all. The countries and
the legal families with the highest revised scores are not correlated
with shareholder dispersion or stock market development. I leave to
the side the problematic claims that “Berle-Means” corporations,
with dispersed shareholding, larger numbers of publicly traded firms,
and a high stock market capitalization relative to GDP, are
economically desirable and confer benefits in excess of costs to the
political economies in which they are prevalent. Yet, there are still
substantial grounds that support the contention that law matters as
an important influence on economic behavior, organization, and
development.
The near-ubiquity and significance of pro-shareholder and
market-enabling legal reforms around the world during the past
twenty years suggest that law is an important influence on financial
practices and economic development. These reforms have displayed a
pronounced trend towards greater shareholder protection and
transparency regulation—during the period of time when financial
markets have exploded in size and holders of financial assets gained
in political influence.29 It is apparent that governments and interest
groups believe that law matters enough to devote substantial political
and actual capital to getting it changed. Nevertheless, it may be far
easier to change formal law and use largely symbolic legal change as
investor/finance-friendly signaling, than to build up regulatory or
judicial enforcement capacities.30 Powerful vested interests resist and

KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001); Robert A. Kagan,
Should Europe Worry About Adversarial Legalism?, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997).
29. See, e.g., GRANT KIRKPATRICK, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SURVEY OF OECD
COUNTRIES (Organizations for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/27/21755678.pdf.
30. Milhaupt and Pistor, for example, characterize the post-Enron and WorldCom
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2003 in these terms, though they do concede that the
law’s corporate governance provisions represent a potentially significant movement towards the
federalization of state corporation law. MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 10, at 56–60; cf.
John W. Cioffi, Revenge of the Law? Securities Litigation Reform and Sarbanes-Oxley’s
Structural Regulation of Corporate Governance, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS: THE
POLITICS OF REGULATORY REFORM 60 (Marc K. Landy et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Coiffi,
Revenge of the Law] (arguing that Sarbanes-Oxley was a more substantive and path-breaking
law than many critics have allowed, though also finding it deeply flawed by political constraints
that precluded more fundamental reforms of corporate boards, the reform of proxy voting
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seek to neuter substantive legal changes and enforcement
mechanisms that challenge their authority and access to rents. State
actors may seek to maintain control over the institutions and
mechanisms of enforcement by opposing the cultivation of private
litigation causes of action and procedures, either out of concern over
the potential abuses and inefficiencies of litigation, or in order to
preserve an important power resource.
The politics—and political obstacles to effective reform—are
likely to play themselves out somewhat differently in developed and
developing countries. Viewed cross-nationally, there are diverse ways
to enforce or otherwise vindicate legal norms that reflect the
different ways in which economies are governed across different
countries with divergent political economic models, legal traditions,
and regulatory frameworks. Economically successful non-liberal or
“coordinated” political economies not only rest on different
institutional foundations and interest group configurations than
liberal market economies, they also may develop institutionally
rooted comparative advantages. These advantages induce broad
resistance to reforms of areas as politically and economically sensitive
as corporate governance and financial system regulation that might
jeopardize these systemic strengths. In developing countries,
constructing institutions of economic governance—be they
regulatory agencies, courts, or private regulatory structures—with
sufficient independence, competence, and integrity to carry out
effective enforcement is one of the most difficult of political tasks,
yet one of the most fundamentally important. This potential
disjuncture between pro-shareholder legal reforms around the world
and the difficulty of developing effective means of enforcing legal
rules and shareholder rights points to a particularly serious problem
for developing countries where legal institutions and the rule of law
itself are weak.
The global salience of law and legal reform in the areas of
financial system and corporate governance reform leads to a deeper
set of problems with the legal origins theory, and even to the
impressive efforts to improve on the quantitative analysis of law,
governance, and finance. Quantitative analyses can be of enormous
use in identifying (and sometimes debunking) broad patterns of

rules and role of institutional investors, the executive compensation practices, or
reconsideration of legislative curbs on private litigation mechanisms).

1516

DO NOT DELETE

1501

2/10/2010 12:48 PM

Legal Regimes and Political Particularism

political economic organization, legal structure, and economic
development. On the other hand, they can also miss vitally important
dimensions of how governance institutions develop and operate in
particular political and social contexts. Perhaps inevitably, they
present a formalist and functionalist conception of law and legal
institutions that make them more amenable to operationalization
and statistical analysis, but obscure how politics and legal practice
determine the forms and functions at the base of the analysis. As one
comparative legal scholar has remarked, “LLSV, for all their
emphasis on legal origins, ultimately do not take the law seriously.”31
The theoretical and analytical approaches of comparative law and
comparative political economy can help fill in the lacunae of
quantitative studies as represented by the legal origins literature.32
IV. LEGAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL FAMILIES AS A PROBLEM OF
COMPARATIVE LAW
The legal families at the conceptual foundation of the legal
origins theory are problematic from the perspective of comparative
legal theory. On the one hand, broad classificatory schemes such as
the basic distinctions between common law and civil law systems,
religious and secular law, and more jurisprudential and philosophical
distinctions between positive law and natural law, are longestablished modes of comparison and analysis. They are quite
deliberately constructed to simplify the intricacies of actual legal
systems into more general categories that can be viewed as Weberian
ideal types. Such categorizations render the particular more readily
accessible and provide the conceptual bases for inferring and
articulating generalizable theoretical and empirical propositions
regarding law, legal systems, and their practical significance.33 On the
other hand, the problem with such classifications is that they tend to
reflect rather thin and formalistic conceptions of law as a set of

31. Ralf Michaels, The Second Wave of Comparative Law and Economics?, 59 U.
TORONTO L.J. 197, 201 (2009).
32. For a review of LLSV urging greater incorporation of qualitative data and political
analysis, see Peter A. Gourevitch, The Politics of Corporate Governance Regulation, 112 YALE
L.J. 1829, 1857 (2003) (reviewing MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003)).
33. See Jaakko Husa, Legal Families and Research in Comparative Law, 1 GLOBAL
JURIST ADVANCES 4 (2001) (citing MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1, 18–22 (1978));
DIRK KÄSLER, MAX WEBER: AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS LIFE AND WORK 180–84 (1988).
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formal provisions and attributes that may tell us very little about how
law and legal institutions develop and their practical significance in
political and economic life.
Legal family groupings suffer from the same reductionism of
ideal-typic classification schemes that tend to sever macro-level
theory and its generalizations from micro-level realities and
analysis.34 Legal origins theory as developed by LLSV seeks to
reconcile the macro- and micro-level dimensions of law through
microeconomic theory and functionalist analysis.35 In the process,
they tend to fall into the traps of functionalism and formalism. LLSV
break down the relevant law of each country and assess it according
to a set of universal juridical benchmarking categories which allow
them to measure legal protection for shareholders.36 Once
categorized, these categories are converted into variables for
statistical analysis. LLSV classify the substantive law of different
countries according to the dominant legal family on which the
national legal system is based and score them with respect to these
formalistic variables.37 For example, LLSV’s well-known and
influential “anti-director rights index” is an aggregate measure of
shareholder rights constructed with reference to six formal legal
characteristics: (1) rights to mail-in proxy voting, (2) voting rights
not constrained by share blocking (or mandatory deposit) rules, (3)
cumulative voting or proportional representation rights, (4)
oppressed minorities mechanisms, (5) preemptive rights, and (6)
rights to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting.38 The data

34. Of course, LLSV and those extending the legal origins theory perform a further step
of simplification of legal systems and their characteristics through numerical operationalization.
See Mathias M. Siems, Numerical Comparative Law: Do We Need Statistical Evidence in Law in
Order to Reduce Complexity?, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 521, 533–38 (2005).
35. For an overview of LLSV’s legal origins theory and method, and a wide-ranging
summary of the micro- and macro-economic empirical findings related to their claims, see
generally Rafael La Porta et al., Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, supra note 1.
36. Id. at 286.
37. Id. at 286–87.
38. LLSV form the antidirector rights index
by adding 1 when (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to
the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the
general shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation
of minorities in the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities
mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a
shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to
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aggregated from the country cases is then analyzed to ascertain the
correlations between legal family of origin and the level of
shareholder rights and protections.39
Variations in national-level shareholder rights and protections are
statistically correlated with legal families of origin.40 Variations in
legal protection for shareholders are also correlated with economic
outcomes such as dispersed shareholding, ownership concentration
and blockholding, returns to equity, and stock market
capitalization.41 The legal categories of comparative analysis that
produce the independent variables are justified by their effects on
controlling agency costs within firm governance as predicted by
economic theory. Not all aspects of legal systems are incorporated
into the analytical framework. Nor are, for the most part, informal
social relations nominally external to formal law. The criteria for
inclusion are derived from microeconomic theory and principalagent theory in particular. Certain types of legal rules compiled into
the “anti-director rights index” are deemed important and worthy of
operationalization, quantification, and analysis because they are
presumed to affect the function of law in reducing agency costs of
shirking and opportunism.42 These reductions of agency costs are
identified ex ante as likely to influence the behavior of individual
market actors.43 This reliance on economic theory and the
identification of specific types of legal rules incorporates aspects of
formalist-functionalist approaches to comparative law into legal
origins theory.44

10 percent (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can
be waived only by a shareholders’ vote.
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 1, at 1122–23, tbl.1. An “[o]ppressed minorities
mechanism” provides for “judicial venue to challenge the decisions of management or of the
assembly or the right to step out of the company by requiring the company to purchase their
shares when they object to certain fundamental changes . . . .” Id. at 1122, tbl.1.
39. See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, supra
note 1 (providing a summary and overview of literature).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. at n.3 and accompanying text.
44. Comparative law has long been both blessed and plagued by a profusion of
theoretical schools and methodologies, each with their own strengths and weaknesses. Scholars
frequently disagree as to what defines different theoretical approaches and despair of the
incoherence of comparative law to the point of declaring it devoid of true theoretical content. I
do not enter into these complex and arcane debates here.
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The legal origins theory, like most economic theorizing, is
deeply functionalist, and thus subject to the general critique of
functionalism that has long been a staple of debate within
comparative law.45 Functionalist accounts of law rest on a set of
assumptions that have been fiercely criticized and contested by other
theoretical approaches to comparative law. Functionalist theory
presumes that “the legal system of every society faces essentially the
same problems, and solves these problems by quite different means
though very often with similar results.”46 The central question posed
by the functional approach to comparative law is: “what legal norms,
concepts or institutions in one system perform the equivalent
functions performed by certain legal norms, concepts or institutions
of another system?”47 Underlying this functionalism is the
conception of law as not merely purposive, but fundamentally
instrumental, as a means of accomplishing a priori specified ends.48
The bias in instrumental-functionalist approaches to legal
comparison favors the analysis and finding of similar or analogous
features across legal systems, rather than difference and divergence.
The latter tend to be screened out in favor of a homogenizing
normative orientation with significant policy implications.49 In legal
origins theory, the general categories of comparison are related to
the common function of minority shareholder protection against
rent-seeking by managers and controlling shareholders.50
Differences enter the comparative analysis with respect to how
well or poorly national legal systems embody given functional
characteristics, yielding independent variables defined in formal legal
terms, and how well they achieve the functional purpose of
shareholder protection, as reflected by dependent variables

45. See Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26
HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 434–40 (1985); Jonathon Hill, Comparative Law, Law Reform and
Legal Theory, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1989).
46. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 34
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
47. W.J. Kamba, Comparative Law A Theoretical Framework, 23 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
485, 517 (1974).
48. See id.
49. Cf. Peer Zumbansen, Comparative Law’s Coming of Age? Twenty Years After
Critical Comparisons, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1073, 1075–76 (2005) (discussing Frankenberg’s
critique of functionalism as a perspective of false objectivity that obscures important
dimensions of law and differences among legal systems).
50. See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra, note 1, at 1120–21.
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measuring quantitative outcomes in shareholder diffusion, stock
market capitalization levels, equity financing, or other similar
variables. As both a conceptual and practical matter, this is an
indispensable form of analysis. Most of us are interested in what laws
and regulations do, in addition to (and sometimes to the exclusion
of) what they mean.51 Functionalism allows for the establishment of
a basis for comparability of different variables and cases. It simplifies
the analytical framework of comparison so that larger numbers of
cases can be accommodated. In this sense, functionalism in
comparative law is conducive, if not essential, to large-n statistical
studies of legal phenomena. However, this mode of inquiry may veil
as much as it explicates, in both normative and empirical terms.
Framing functionality in terms of shareholder protection, let
alone in terms of shareholder maximization, is neither normatively
nor politically neutral. By so specifying the functional categories on
which the comparative analysis is based, the legal origins literature
has a potent normative and practical policy thrust consistent with the
ideology and policy agenda of shareholder value.52 Even when LLSV
describe legal families as historical legacies, their formalistic
conception and operationalization of law and legal rules underlying
the classificatory scheme militates against historical and political
understanding of legal and institutional change. Seeking the
objectivity of universal benchmarks, the approach dislocates legal
systems, legal rules, and political economic arrangements from their
temporal, political, sociological, and cultural contexts. The
theoretical framework thus effectively depoliticizes the origins and
course of development of a nation’s legal system.53 The “origins” of

51. Compare Frankenberg, supra note 45, with Zumbansen, supra note 49, at 1073–84
(criticizing functionalism for denigrating or ignoring the meaning and informal dimensions of
law in its social context).
52. For an excellent discussion of shareholder value as ideological tenet and policy goal,
see William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for
Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 13 (2000).
53. As expressed by Günter Frankenberg in a brutal and classic formulation:
The functionalist negates the interaction between legal institutions and provisions by
stripping them from their systemic context and integrating them in an artificial
universal typology of “solutions.” In this way, “function” is reified as a principle of
reality and not taken as an analytical principle that orders the real world. It becomes
the magic carpet that shuttles us between the abstract and the concrete, that
transcends the boundaries of national legal concepts, that builds the system of
comparative law, the “universal” comparative legal science or “the general law.”
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national legal systems are reduced to a unitary and over-simplified
assignation of predominant legal family—even where the foundations
of national legal systems were imposed by an intermediating colonial
power, as in the case of former Spanish dominions in Latin America
designated as within the French legal family, or where they are the
product of successive colonial powers or borrowings from a variety of
legal traditions or families. The legal families at the base of the legal
origins theory of law and finance are thus conceived and elaborated
as historically given phenomena, yet, at least as presented in the work
of LLSV,54 legal families and their diffusion are largely ahistorical.
However, the legal systems and traditions that form the origins of
legal families emerged in specific jurisdictions under particular
political and economic conditions, and were thereafter
geographically diffused, either through coercive imposition (usually
through colonialism) or by voluntary appropriation from their source
country to another.
The use of formal legal categories as analytical tools or measures
is often appropriate and useful, but such research methods and
designs may screen out the historical and often intensely politicized
processes of conflict, contestation, legal borrowing, and
transplantation that determined the substance of these very
categories in specific cases, processes that will continue to shape their
development in the present and future. The development of legal
systems, like that of states, unfolds over long periods of time, but the
course of change often displays patterns of punctuated equilibrium
or evolution. Political and economic change, crisis, and conflict are
all ineradicably central to the dynamic of legal change and its effects
on other dimensions of social organization and practice. Neither
history nor politics can be treated so cavalierly as to become
analytically epiphenomenal. Legal systems and bodies of law are
often more accurately described as the products of bricolage, the
recombination of borrowed elements appropriated from multiple
legal traditions and systems, rather than direct lineal descendents of

Frankenberg, supra note 45, at 440. With respect to LLSV and much law and economics
scholarship, one might extend Frankenberg’s logic a step further to argue that reified
categories that “transcend[] the boundaries of national legal concepts” are used to build a
“universal” social science of general economic laws. Id.
54. See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 1, at 1117–18.
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originating legal “families.”55 (And this notion of bricolage, of
course, does not fully engage the endogenous production of truly
novel and innovative forms of legal and institutional change.) This is
particularly so in domains such as securities regulation and corporate
governance law. These overlapping areas of law are typically
complex, nationally distinctive, and politically sensitive, yet are
simultaneously exposed to increasing international market and
political pressures. The regularity of financial crisis fosters waves of
policy and legal change. The activities of transnational private
organizations, ranging from markets to industrial firms and
production networks, from financial institutions and markets to
investment funds and shareholder advocacy groups, along with
growth and increasing activities of multilateral institutions, create
conditions that enable and intensify political and economic pressures
for the diffusion of ideas and juridical concepts.56
The combination of excess functionalism and formalism, such as
that found in the legal origins theory, thus, may distort our
understanding of how law and legal systems evolve, operate, and
shape behavior in a given social or political setting. The functions
fulfilled by legal rules and institutions are determined by political
factors such as state institutional structure, interest group
composition and alignments, partisan political conflict and
competition, and by locally fashioned epistemic, ideological, and
normative meanings of law. The purely instrumental economic
effects of law are but one part of a much larger terrain in which law
and its development are situated. As Peer Zumbansen notes,
By stressing the production of “solutions” through legal
regulations, the functionalist dismisses as irrelevant or does not
even recognize that law also produces and stocks interpretive
patterns and visions of life which shape people’s ways of organizing

55. See JOHN L. CAMPBELL, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION 69–74
(2004) (developing a theory of institutional change through bricolage). Campbell’s theory of
institutional change via bricolage does not explicitly address or seek to explain legal
development, but the dynamic of appropriation and recombination lends itself particularly well
to law where professionalization of jurists and transnational experience in legal practice often
foster familiarity with and enable borrowing of foreign legal concepts and mechanisms.
56. See, e.g., Holly J. Gregory, The Globalization of Corporate Governance, Part 1,
GLOBAL COUNSEL, 52 (Sept. 2000); Holly J. Gregory, The Globalization of Corporate
Governance, Part 2, GLOBAL COUNSEL, 51 (Oct. 2000); cf. CAMPBELL, supra note 55, at
163–67 (arguing that multilateral organizations have had limited effects on diffusion and
implementation of neo-liberal ideas and policies).
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social experience, giving it meaning, qualifying it as normal and just
or as deviant or unjust.57

Conversely, law as a discourse, institutional environment, and as a
determinant of other political and economic institutional
arrangements may constitute the meaning and alter the conduct of
social, political, and economic activity.58
Two further fundamental difficulties arise from comparative
functionalism once law is considered as a component of a national
political economic regime. First, the contextualization of law in
divergent institutional and political contexts may result in legal rules
fulfilling different or multiple functions that are simply not detected
when using a conceptual approach and methodology that imposes
uniform functional categories. What law means to actors in a
particular social and institutional context may have a significant
impact on what it does, i.e., the ways in which it shapes behavior.59
Legal theory stretching back at least as far as legal realism and well
represented in law and society scholarship on the “law in action” has
long focused on precisely these kinds of issues.60 The analysis of the
practical, cognitive, and ideological effects of law is thus a valuable
part of what Theda Skocpol described as “the dialectic of meaningful
actions and structural determinants.”61 However, such substantive
and theoretical concerns typically favor the use of qualitative “thick
description” or analytic narratives over quantitative analysis in order
to discover how the embedding of law in social and institutional
contexts influences the impact of law on the perceptions and
behavior of individuals and groups.62
57. Zumbansen, supra note 49, at 1076 (citing Frankenberg, supra note 45, at 438).
58. See id.
59. Cf. Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, The “New Institutionalism,” and the
Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89 (1988) (discussing the theoretical
development of sociological institutionalism and its potential to integrate normative and
structural understandings of social and political phenomena, including law).
60. Indeed, the seminal work of Berle and Means and J. Willard Hurst’s later pioneering
socio-legal work on law and the rise of the large corporation can be seen as foundational to this
theoretical perspective on law. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY
OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1970).
61. Theda Skocpol, Sociology’s Historical Imagination, in VISION AND METHOD IN
HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY 1, 4 (Theda Skocpol ed., 1984).
62. For two excellent examples of the use of analytical narratives in the study of
comparative corporate governance, see GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 10 (employing a
mixed methods approach using both analytical narratives and statistical analysis), and
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Second, a legal rule, principle, or concept may reflect and
reconcile conflicting norms that likewise may go undetected and
otherwise be devalued by a simpler, more reductive functional
analysis. Fiduciary duties in corporate law have a shareholder
protection function, but also may embody managerialist
understandings
of
corporate
control.
Likewise,
labor
codetermination laws in Germany and many other European
countries not only serve a legitimizing function for private enterprise
and the corporate form, but they also play a role in structuring the
broader national labor relations and production systems.63 Other
areas of corporate law, such as fiduciary obligations and rules
governing board structure and meetings, may reflect the necessary
normative and functional accommodation of labor representation on
the supervisory board and on works councils that complicates the
assignation of a specific function to parts of a complex legal
framework. Codetermination law and other aspects of corporate law
more generally may run counter to narrow short-term shareholder
interests, but they may also serve efficiency enhancing ends. The
legitimizing function served by protection of employee or other
stakeholder interests may reduce potentially costly social and political
conflict (or other more costly forms of government intervention into
firm affairs).64 Likewise, given complementary institutional
arrangements,65 such rules may help create comparative advantages in
certain industries and markets.66 Functionalist analyses can address
MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 10 (using a form of analytical narratives to present
“institutional autopsies” of financial and corporate governance crises).
63. See Kathleen Thelen, Why German Employers Cannot Bring Themselves to Dismantle
the German Model, in UNIONS, EMPLOYERS, AND CENTRAL BANKS 138–69 (Torben Iversen,
Jonas Pontusson & David Soskice eds., 2000).
64. See generally KATHLEEN A. THELEN, UNION OF PARTS: LABOR POLITICS IN
POSTWAR GERMANY (1991); Wolfgang Streeck, Co-determination: After Four Decades, in
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: STUDIES OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN ADVANCED CAPITALISM 137 (Wolfgang Streeck ed., 1992) [hereinafter Streeck, Codetermination].
65. Complementary institutions are those whose coupling makes them more
economically efficient than either would be in isolation. See, e.g., Peter A. Hall & David
Soskice, An Introduction to the Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, supra
note 10, at 1.
66. This is a key claim of a large and influential body of comparative political economy
scholarship. See, e.g., id.; Gregory Jackson, Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan:
Liberalization Pressures and Responses During the 1990s, in THE END OF DIVERSITY?
PROSPECTS FOR GERMAN AND JAPANESE CAPITALISM 261 (Kozo Yamamura & Wolfgang
Streeck eds., 2003); Gregory Jackson, The Origins of Nonliberal Corporate Governance in
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these sorts of complications in determining the roles law plays in
social and economic life, but to do so they must view legal rules and
institutions within their larger institutional and historical contexts.
The irony underlying this treatment of law in the legal origins
theory, and much functionalist analysis based on economic theory, is
that along the way to concluding that law matters, the theoretical
and analytical framework does not take law itself seriously.
Law is a system of normative rules that is not only the product of
the historical interplay of exogenous and endogenous political and
economic forces, but constitutive of political and economic
arrangements. Law and legal systems, if they are anything more than
a formalistic Potempkin village of provisions without effective
enforcement or compliance, have their own semi-autonomous
internal logic that plays a significant role in constituting the
institutional environment in which political and economic action
occurs. The more robust the rule of law is in a given political system,
the more important this constitutive role of law will be. Two
implications flow from this observation. First, comparative law would
benefit from approaches to the study of comparative political
economy that focus on the institutional logic and historical
development of complex political economic systems. The two fields
naturally complement one another, but remain largely distinct and
autonomous to the disadvantage of each. Second, countries and their
legal systems must be distinguished for analytical purposes on the
basis of their relative institutionalization and robustness of the rule of
law before anything can be said regarding the effects of law on
economic organization and other outcomes. These two subjects are
discussed in the following sections.

Germany and Japan, in THE ORIGINS OF NONLIBERAL CAPITALISM: GERMANY AND JAPAN IN
COMPARISON 121, 169 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kozo Yamamura eds., 2001); Wolfgang Streeck,
On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production, in BEYOND KEYNESIANISM:
THE SOCIO-ECONOMICS OF PRODUCTION AND FULL EMPLOYMENT 21 (Wolfgang Streeck &
Egon Matzner eds., 1991); Sigurt Vitols, Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing
Germany and the UK, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 337. For an analysis of
the role of legal norms and methods in underpinning different “varieties of capitalism,” see
Katharina Pistor, Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies (European
Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 30, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=695763.
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V. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LEGALINSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Comparative political economy should have a deep affinity for
comparative legal analysis. More specifically, the historical
institutionalist school of comparative political economy has much to
gain from comparative law.67 Unfortunately, law has not taken up
the central position in the study of political and economic
institutions that its role in social life would justify.68 Political science
as a field has largely marginalized the study of law to its own
periphery.69 Legal scholars can hardly avoid politics and routinely
enrich their work with political analysis, but historical institutionalist
theory and empirical work seldom influence the thinking and work
of academic legal analysis.70 At least in advanced industrial
economies, law plays an important role in ordering economic activity
and constituting institutions—including the corporation—that shape
the identities, interests, and strategies pursued by economic actors
and groups. Indeed, one of the major contributions of the legal
origins literature is the consistent argument that differences in legal

67. Historical institutionalism is a large and varied literature containing numerous
conflicting theoretical approaches. For theoretical works summarizing historical
institutionalism as a theoretical framework in comparative political economy, see CAMPBELL,
supra note 55; STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen & Frank Longstreth eds., 1992); Coling Hay &
Daniel Wincott, Structure, Agency, and Historical Institutionalism, 46 POL. STUD. 951, 951–
57 (1998); Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol, Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary
Political Science, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 693 (Ira Katznelson
& Helen V. Milner eds., 2002); Kathleen Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative
Politics, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 369 (1999). This literature also has a branch focused
exclusively on the United States known as American political development. See generally
KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT (2004).
68. For an earlier plea to incorporate law in institutionalist theory, see Smith, supra note
59, at 89–108. Unfortunately, Smith’s proposed theoretical and research agenda was not
widely embraced.
69. The sub-field of public law has been reduced, in the main, though not entirely, to
the study of judicial behavior and the study of courts in policy areas.
70. For prominent exceptions integrating comparative political economy within legal
scholarship, see Pistor, supra note 66; MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 10; Peer Zumbansen,
Varieties of Capitalism and the Learning Firm: Corporate Governance and Labour in the
Context of Contemporary Developments in European and German Company Law, 8 EUR. BUS.
ORG. L. REV. 467 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=993910; Peer Zumbansen
& Daniel Saam, The ECJ, Volkswagen and European Corporate Law: Reshaping the European
Varieties of Capitalism, 8 GERMAN L.J. 1027 (2007).
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rules produce significant variation in economic organization and
outcomes.71
Law also plays an important role in structuring politics in a
multitude of ways and on multiple levels: constitutional law,
legislation and statutory law, regulatory rule-making and processes,
case law, and the roles and powers of courts and other adjudicatory
bodies. Law is both the product of politics and part of the political
machinery that produces it. This dual role makes law and regulation
a vital component of the institutional arrangements that define much
of the public and private spheres—and the relations between them.
Disentangling the relationship between law as product and law as
political architecture is at once difficult and necessary, and it is made
more difficult, if not impossible, by ahistorical theories. Hence, a
historically grounded approach to political analysis is particularly
useful to the study of how law functions as part of the political
economy.
Historical institutionalism as a theoretical approach to the study
of political economy represented a response by scholars during the
1980s and 1990s to older theories of interest group politics and
structural functionalism, as well as to some characteristics and
currents of rational choice theory.72 From interest group theory, and
later from rational choice theory, historical institutionalism
appropriated the concepts of group competition for scarce resources,
instrumental calculation, and strategic action.73 Structural
functionalism contributed the conception that the polity and political
economy are comprised of systematically interacting institutional
components. The structural relations among these institutional
features allocate power and resources asymmetrically, and thus
privilege some groups over others in ways that contribute to
distinctive trajectories of development over time.74 This aspect of
structural analysis problematizes interests and preferences that form a
71. See, e.g., La Porta et al., Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, supra note 1, at
285–89.
72. For a classic summary of historical institutionalism, contrasting it with the rational
choice and sociological variants of the “new institutionalism,” see Peter A. Hall & Rosemary
C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936 (1996).
For an early statement of the intellectual and research agenda of historical institutionalism, see
STRUCTURING POLITICS, supra note 66, at ix–xiii.
73. Hall & Taylor, supra note 72, at 937; see also THELEN, supra note 64, at 373–74
(discussing the relationship between rational choice and historical institutionalism).
74. Hall & Taylor, supra note 72, at 937.
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critical point of distinction between historical institutionalist theory
and the assumptions of rational self-interest at the foundation of
neo-classical economics. For historical institutionalists, interests and
even interest group identities are the endogenous product of
institutional arrangements, including legal and regulatory
frameworks.75 Different groups form and their structure, scope,
composition, and political and economic strength vary under
divergent institutional and legal arrangements.76 The incentives and
opportunity structures they face differ across institutional contexts
and as a result of their internal differences.77
As a consequence, actors and groups may want very different
things from the political and legal systems. Actors and groups can
seek to maximize many sorts of benefits—wealth, status, security—
and they can seek to maximize them over different time frames.
Political and economic actors direct instrumental strategic action
towards the pursuit of interests that have themselves been influenced
by the legal and institutional environment that defines the available
means to rationally pursue them (including group formation). Social
values may play an important role in determining preferences within
this universe of endogenous preferences, ideas and cultural norms.
However, these subjective and contextually contingent interests may
be pursued with ruthless and calculating efficiency appropriate to an
institutional environment that privileges certain groups, interests,

75. See CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER, supra note 10, at ch. 2; CAMPBELL,
supra note 55, at 145–46, 174–75, 185–86.
76. See generally Hall and Taylor, supra note 72, at 937–41; Kathleen Thelen, Historical
Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 369–404
(1999); STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth eds., 1992); PETER A.
HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY: THE POLITICS OF STATE INTERVENTION IN BRITAIN AND
FRANCE 233, 276–80 (1986); Wolfgang Streeck and Phillipe C. Schmitter, Community,
Market, State—and Associations? The Progressive Contribution of Interest Governance to Social
Order, in PRIVATE INTEREST GOVERNMENT: BEYOND MARKET AND STATE 1, 1–29 (Wolfgang
Streeck & Phillipe C. Schmitter eds., 1985); cf. Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In:
Strategies of Analysis in Current Research, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 3–42 (Peter B.
Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol eds., 1985); JOHN ZYSMAN, GOVERNMENTS,
MARKETS AND GROWTH, chs. 1–2 (1983) (interests and adjustment strategies of private actors
and groups shaped by institutionally-defined state capacities to develop and implement
interventionist policies).
77. See, e.g., Christine Mahoney, The Power of Institutions: State and Interest-Group
Activity in the European Union, 5 EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS 441 (2004); Gary Marks &
Doug McAdam, Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in the
European Union, 19 W. EUR. POL. 249 (1996).

1529

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/10/2010 12:48 PM

2009

and strategies over others. The social and institutional environment
of a competitive marketplace fosters and reinforces the form of
rational self-interest and economistic utility maximization found in
most economic theory. From this vantage point, the market order
and its associated conceptions of norms and interests is a special case,
rather than a universal description of the essential attributes of socioeconomic relations. In sum, institutions are inherently biased in their
allocation of power and authority, the formation of interests, and
their influence in constituting the normative appropriateness of
behavior. Law tends to reinforce these biases by constituting or
buttressing institutions.
Institutions not only constitute and shape power relations, they
are, of course, the historical products of political conflicts, bargains,
and consensus that then tend to become path dependent. Law
provides a particularly important example of both the historical
processes of development and of path dependence. One of the
primary values of a legal order is its relative stability, whether one
describes that value in terms of making credible commitments,
establishing functional organizational routines, or the protection of
particularly important norms. The stability of the legal order derives
from both power relationships and cognitive, or ideational, factors.
First, legal rules and institutions mobilize bias.78 They tend to
empower, structurally entrench, and often enrich certain groups over
others. Legal structures thereby tend to secure their own persistence
and reproduction by creating asymmetries of power that benefit
groups with a material interest in maintaining legally legitimated and
privileged access to state power to enforce their claims.
For example, once corporate governance law tipped in favor of
managerial interests in the late-nineteenth century United States (a
consequence of American federalism and prevailing doctrines of
constitutional law), managers had increased discretionary power over
the resources of large corporate firms to reinforce their legally
secured positions against both labor and holders of financial capital.79

78. Cf. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 65 (1960). Later institutionalist theory built on Schattschneider’s
seminal formulation by focusing on the constitutive role of institutional arrangements on
individual and group identities and interests.
79. See, e.g., ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS, supra note 10; ROE,
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS, supra note 8; Roe, Political Theory, supra note 10; Roe, Some
Differences in Corporate Structure, supra note 10.
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Successive political backlashes against managerial insulation, most
notably during the New Deal, the post-Watergate 1970s, and the
post-Enron period of reform during the early to mid-2000s, only
partially undermined or reversed these legal and institutional
advantages in corporate governance, while pension and labor laws
tended to reduce the threat these constituencies posed to the
authority of managers.80 Conversely, where stakeholder governance
became enshrined in law, as in Continental Europe and to some
extent Japan, these arrangements, however incomprehensible to the
general public in their myriad details, were substantially locked in by
the interest group politics that corporate governance law informed
and shaped.81
Second, law is inherently normative and this has political and
sociological ramifications. Law, at least in functional democratic
political systems, is a repository of social values, or, to use Katarina
Pistor’s term, “ground rules.”82 Where this is the case, the path
dependence of law reflects not only the potentially pathological and
dysfunctional lock-in effects of institutions, but the stability of a
society’s underlying ideological commitments to identifiable
normative understandings (and at times aspirations). Even in its
driest most technical manifestations, and corporate governance law is
in many respects dry and technical, it embodies not only the
concretization of interest group bargaining and political

80. John W. Cioffi, Restructuring “Germany Inc.”: The Politics of Company and Takeover
Law Reform in Germany and the European Union, 24 LAW & POL’Y 355 (2002); John W.
Cioffi, The State of the Corporation: State Power, Politics, Policymaking, and Corporate
Governance in the United States, Germany, and France, in TRANSATLANTIC POLICYMAKING IN
AN AGE OF AUSTERITY: DIVERSITY AND DRIFT 253 (Martin A. Levin & Martin Shapiro eds.,
2004); John W. Cioffi, Building Finance Capitalism: The Regulatory Politics of Corporate
Governance Reform in the United States and Germany, in THE STATE AFTER STATISM: NEW
STATE ACTIVITIES IN THE AGE OF LIBERALIZATION 185 (Jonah Levy ed., 2006) [hereinafter
Cioffi, Building Finance Capitalism]; John W. Cioffi, Corporate Governance Reform,
Regulatory Politics, and the Foundations of Finance Capitalism in the United States and
Germany, 7 GERMAN L.J. 533 (2006); Cioffi, Revenge of the Law?, supra note 30, at 60.
81. See, e.g., John W. Cioffi & Martin Höpner, The Political Paradox of Finance
Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance
Reform, 34 POL. & SOC’Y 463 (2006) [hereinafter Cioffi & Höpner, The Political Paradox of
Finance Capitalism]; John W. Cioffi & Martin Höpner, Das Parteipolitische Paradox des
Finanzmarktkapitalismus: Aktionärsorientierte Reformen in Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien
und den USA [The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Shareholder Reform in Germany,
France, Italy, and the USA], 47 POLITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT 419 (2006) (F.R.G.)
[hereinafter Cioffi & Höpner, Political Paradox: Shareholder Reform].
82. Pistor, supra note 66, at 2.
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maneuvering, but implicit or explicit normative and ontological
beliefs about the world.83 Once in place, legal rules tend to be
invested with the imprimatur of the state and are often endowed
with legitimacy by virtue of being legal.84 Stripping legal rules and
principles out of their broader normative, institutional, and
economic contexts inevitably defines them in the thinnest of terms
and distorts their meaning and function through excessive
abstraction and formalism. Law is placed outside of politics and
history. Accordingly, its origins and the recursive processes of legal
and institutional change are obscured along with law’s practical
import.
As noted above, our understanding of law and legal systems,
especially in comparative perspective, benefits from greater historical
grounding and an explicit recognition of the ways in which the
regulatory effects of legal rules and norms are embedded in and
informed by their social and institutional context. This kind of
analysis, however, favors small-n qualitative studies richer in
narrative, nuance, and detail than can be captured by large-n
quantitative methods. Qualitative approaches to research and analysis
may trade off the parsimonious elegance and claims to
generalizability of well-designed statistical studies and economic
models for a fuller description of how legal and political economic
systems operate and develop, but the trade-off goes both ways.
Large-n quantitative analysis suffers from its own problems, namely
that “the more cases scholars include in a study, the less likely they
are to grasp the full range of information pertinent to understanding

83. More prosaically, perhaps, the influence of law in creating incentives to form certain
types of organizational structures, such as the publicly traded corporation, and to pursue
specific economic strategies, such as financially-driven management and restructuring, reaches
down indirectly yet deeply into the micro-level of individual and collective behavior. As
theorized by scholars of organization theory and sociological institutionalism, personnel within
complex bureaucratic organizations that develop in a given legal environment commonly
routinize tasks and orient behavior to scripts and norms of appropriateness that tend to have
considerable resilience in the absence of external disruption. For a review, see, for example,
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS ch. 1 (Paul DiMaggio & Walter
Powell eds., 1991). For an application to corporate management and governance, see NEIL D.
FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL (1993).
84. For a brilliant empirical study elaborating on this self-legitimating character of law,
see William Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1111
(1989); see also WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT (1991) (studying the impact of the courts and labor law on the evolution of
American “business” unionism).
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those cases.”85 It would be foolish to dispense with one mode of
research and analysis or the other, but it is essential to understand
their respective limitations.
Studies can draw on both modes of inquiry to good effect, as a
number of recent major works on comparative corporate governance
have done. Mark Roe, for example, has combined political history,
economic theories of principal-agent problems, and statistical analysis
in elaborating his political theory of comparative corporate
governance. He has focused on political conflicts between right and
left parties and between labor and capital as the driving forces of
structural change in law, finance, and ownership.86 Roe has argued
that where the political left is politically strong, or where antifinancier populism is both prevalent and empowered by the structure
of the state, shareholders are unable to secure effective legal means
to constrain rent-seeking by labor and managers.87 Shareholders thus
tend to adopt blockholding strategies of control that impede the
development of diffuse shareholding, the separation of ownership
and control, and liquid securities markets.88 Under this analysis, law
matters, but it serves as an intermediate, rather than as an
independent, variable.
Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn use a combination of large-n
statistical techniques, institutional typologies of coordinated and
liberal market economies appropriated from the “varieties of
capitalism” literature, institutional theories of veto point politics, and
qualitative analytical narratives to advance a coalitional theory of
cross-national differences in corporate governance regimes.89
Corporate governance law and regulation will vary cross-nationally—
and change over time—depending on the interest group or interest
group coalition that prevails in political struggle over corporate
governance policy and lawmaking.90 Where shareholders are

85. Gregory J. Kasza, Quantitative Methods: Reflection on the Files of Recent Job
Applicants, in PERESTROIKA! THE RAUCOUS REBELLION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 421, 425
(Kristen Renwick Monroe ed., 2005); see also Siems, supra note 34, at 521–40 (cautioning that
statistical analysis of law and legal institutions is subject to substantial error and
incompleteness).
86. See, e.g., ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS, supra note 8.
87. Id. at 1–5.
88. Id.
89. See GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 10.
90. See id. at 23, 59–67, tbls.2.3 & 4.1.
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politically victorious, either alone (rather unlikely) or in alliance with
managers or labor, they are likely to secure policies and laws
conducive to securities market development and the dispersion of
shareholding into the classic Berle-Means separation of ownership
and control.91 Where shareholders lose to an alliance of labor and
managers, for example, a bank-centered financial system will likely
persist and shareholding is once again likely to remain concentrated
in blockholding patterns within a “corporatist compromise”
underlying the coordinated market economies identified by the
varieties of capitalism literature.92 These interest group alignments
and their respective interests vary cross-nationally, and these
differences are powerfully shaped by the legacies of institutional
arrangements within the state, firm, and markets.93
Yves Tiberghien employs both statistical measures of bureaucratic
autonomy and process tracing to explain the politics of corporate
governance reform in response to the globalization of financial
markets and capital flows.94 This framework focuses even more on
the political and policy-making agency of state actors, and thus relies
on structural characteristics of state bureaucracies (and thus to some
extent on cross-national differences in public law) in explaining the
character and extent of pro-shareholder reforms. The ability to
successfully reform corporate governance and financial market
regulation is substantially determined by the institutional insulation
of bureaucrats from short-term political pressures.
These studies are noteworthy in the ways they depart from
and/or supplement statistical methodology and microeconomic
theory that characterizes the legal origins literature. They implicitly
or explicitly problematize the transparency, rigor, and precision of
numbers in the study of something so complex, socially embedded,
and often maddeningly ambiguous as law. These problems do crop
up in the legal origins literature, most directly in the problems of
quantification of its core legal and institutional variables as pointed
out by a number of critics. Yet, this means that the legal origins
literature tends to be analytically limited by the time-bound
correlational snapshots it produces of complex and dynamic legal and

91.
92.
93.
94.
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economic systems.95 The political economy approaches to the subject
of corporate governance mentioned above grapple in their own way
with the important problem of stability and change, which, in an age
of reform and political economic crisis, is a matter of preeminent
concern.
VI. LEGAL ORIGINS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PATH
DEPENDENCE AND REFORM
Theorization of the “stickiness” or path dependence of
institutional arrangements, which may include legal and regulatory
structures, is one of the strengths and accomplishments of the “new
institutionalisms” in economics, political science, and sociology, but
it is also one of their weaknesses.96 Though recent scholarship has
sought to address the problem of institutional and policy
development,97 much institutionalist theory and analysis is far more
compelling as a way to explain stability than change. Likewise, legal
origins theory, despite its exceedingly thin conception of law and
institutions, is deeply and profoundly path dependent. Some of the
developmental paths implicit in its attention to the colonial roots of
many national legal systems stretch back for centuries. Path
dependence is important to the study of political, legal, and
economic phenomena, but it is not eternal or over-determining.
The path dependence of the LLSV contention that legal origins,
often in the distant past, determine current states of financial
development and corporate ownership patterns yields two distinct
weaknesses. First, without historical grounding, LLSV are left with
correlations without convincing mechanisms of causation to buttress
their claims. Second, to some extent LLSV were historically unlucky.
Just as they began to publish their work on the effects of legal
origins, a wave of corporate governance and securities law reforms
swept much of the world. If national corporate governance regimes

95. Capturing longer-term developmental trends and dynamics poses extraordinarily
difficult problems of data gathering and quality that must be overcome before engaging in
credible longitudinal and time-series analysis. Given extant controversies over data and
operationalization within the legal origins literature, and the decline in the availability and
quality of historical data going back in time, many of these problems are unlikely to be resolved
satisfactorily.
96. See Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New
Institutionalisms, 44 POLITICAL STUDIES 936 (1996).
97. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 55.
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and their legal components are so deeply path dependent, how could
they have changed so quickly, over so much of the world, and in
some cases repeatedly? In short, what we know of the recent and
more distant history of financial systems and corporate capitalism
casts doubt on LLSV’s causal claims concerning the long-term
influence of legal families.
In their article, The Great Reversals, Raghuram Rajan and Luigi
Zingales advanced one of the most devastating critiques of the legal
origins theory and its findings.98 Rajan and Zingales note that in
1913 the major national economies in Continental Europe were far
more financially developed than the United States (as measured by
bank deposits and stock market capitalization as a percentage of
GDP, share issues, and number of listed firms).99 The traumatic
economic shocks and upheavals of the two World Wars and
especially the Great Depression triggered a political process of
financial autarky that tightly constrained international capital flows
and repressed financial market activities in order to create the
structural conditions necessary to develop broad welfare state social
insurance programs.100 The post-war Bretton Woods monetary
regime then institutionalized and entrenched this semi-closure of
financial systems and sustained the broad trend towards social
democracy across most of the industrialized countries.101 However,
this transformation of the international economy and the political
economies of the industrialized countries that fashioned it does not
explain the variation across countries even during this period. From
1929 to 1980, the once robust financial markets and equity-driven
finance of most civil law European countries and Japan contracted,
while they rebounded in the common law-based United States and
the United Kingdom. Rajan and Zingales attribute this divergence in
post-war financial development to the greater state-sanctioned
cartelization of finance during the period owing to the relative ease
of regulatory capture of more centralized states.102 Only the

98. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 5.
99. Id. at 6–9.
100. Id. at 37–38.
101. Though they note that Keynes was among the architects of the Bretton Woods
regime, Rajan and Zingales do not discuss the importance of the fact that the closure of
national financial markets also facilitated policies of Keynesian demand management by
removing the threat of capital flight in response to inflationary policies. Id. at 38–39.
102. Id. at 42–43.
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breakdown of the original Bretton Woods system unleashed market
forces that would erode these domestic cartels and state controls on
finance and spur the belated development of financial markets
around the world.103
In this telling, the role of law—and legislation in particular—
remains somewhat ambiguous, but its most salient function and
effect is the repression of market finance. This would still make law
and regulation an important subject in the study of financial
development and corporate governance regimes.104 The focus of
theory and research shifts from seeking to demonstrate why common
law systems arguably have fostered the growth of securities markets
and the dispersion of shareholding, to explaining how and why so
many non-common law systems developed in ways that thwarted
these developments.105
However, this leads to an objection to the Rajan and Zingales
analysis. They appear to naturalize the Berle-Means firm and large,
highly liquid securities markets. Absent the pernicious efforts of
would-be private sector rent-seekers, governments, and state
bureaucrats, this is how capitalist economies will develop. However,
that capitalist economies will naturally or spontaneously develop the
Berle-Means paradigm is unlikely and implausible. There are too
many agency problems and too much volatility in the liberal market
financial and corporate governance model to cavalierly declare it to
be a natural outcome of market processes. This suspicion is
supported by the fact that liberalizing legal reforms and the epochal
growth of international financial markets during the past twenty to
thirty years have not necessarily transformed many national financial
systems and/or corporate governance practices.
It would also be an astonishing coincidence that most countries
did not develop the liberal market paradigm. Unless the liberal
market model is both natural and extremely fragile (which may be
plausible in light of the financial crises of the past two decades and
especially after the events of 2007–2009), Rajan and Zingales’s
analysis requires us to believe that all these countries successfully
repressed the natural course of capitalist development.

103. Id. at 43.
104. Cf. id. at 41 (checks on policymaking by independent courts have a significant
influence on regulatory and financial developments in the United States).
105. Id. at 42–43.

1537

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/10/2010 12:48 PM

2009

Regardless of the merits of the political explanation Rajan and
Zingales offer for these outcomes,106 their empirical findings pose a
direct challenge to the legal origins theory. The logic of the LLSV
argument is that legal origins set the basic structure of law and legal
institutions in countries to which foreign legal families are exported,
and that these structures continue to exercise a consistent influence
on the law-taker countries’ financial and corporate governance
systems. This presumes that the countries of legal origin and
destination have similar financial orders soon after the period of legal
system transplantation (i.e., weak financial markets, little equity
finance, and few publicly traded firms). Feeble financial markets and
shareholder rights at the time of origin result in feeble markets and
protections decades (or centuries) later. However, Rajan and
Zingales marshal compelling evidence that, in the early
twentiethcentury, Germany and France, two of the leading legal
sources for the diffusion of their respective legal families, had highly
developed market-driven finance systems, as did Japan (which
appropriated much of the German legal model).107 This finding
appears to directly contradict the logic of path dependence on which
the legal origins thesis rests, and suggests the need for an alternative
political explanation for cross-national and inter-temporal
variation.108
A second serious empirical challenge to the path dependent logic
of the legal origins theory is that there have been striking trends in
corporate governance reform around the world over the past two

106. Rajan and Zingales argue, albeit rather tentatively, that decentralized law making
through judge-made law and precedent characteristic of common law countries was less prone
to capture than more centralized legislative functions of civil law systems. See id. at 42–43. This
argument is unpersuasive. Even if state policymaking was captured by financial interests in
Western Europe and Japan in the post-1929 or post-1945 period, that has nothing to do with
the decentralization of common law rule formation. The post-war era witnessed the rise of the
administrative state and regulatory bureaucracies in all these countries which could and
regularly did override common law rules and doctrines. Some other political explanation is
necessary to explain the outcomes.
107. Id. at 14–16, 39–41.
108. A number of scholars have attempted to develop political explanations of crossnational variation in financial system and corporate governance structures. See, e.g., ROGER M.
BARKER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, COMPETITION, AND POLITICAL PARTIES: EXPLAINING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHANGE IN EUROPE (forthcoming Jan. 2010); CIOFFI, PUBLIC
LAW AND PRIVATE POWER, supra note 10; GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 10; ROE,
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS, supra note 8; TIBERGHIEN, supra note 10.
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decades.109 Encompassing changes in both securities and company
law, corporate governance reforms have consistently favored the
expansion of shareholder rights and protections in securities
regulation and corporate law. Corporate governance law and
regulation across the major industrialized countries have undergone
substantial re-regulation, reflecting efforts by political and economic
elites to foster the development of domestic financial markets,
financial services, and market-driven economic restructuring
beginning at the firm level.110 This is consistent with Rajan and
Zingales’s finding of increased market development after the early
1980s and arguably demonstrates a contemporary “great reversal”—
at least in law and regulation.111
Once again, these developments undermine the legal-empirical
premises and path dependent logic of the legal origins theory.
Established legal structures and traditions do not appear to have
109. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A
SURVEY OF OECD COUNTRIES (2004) (reviewing trends in corporate governance reform,
particularly after the Enron-era corporate scandals and stock market crashes).
110. See generally TIBERGHIEN, supra note 10; Cioffi, Building Finance Capitalism,
supra note 80 (comparing contemporary reform and the emergence of “finance capitalism” in
the United States and Germany); Cioffi & Höpner, Political Paradox: Shareholder Reform,
supra note 81; Cioffi & Höpner, The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism, supra note 81
(examining center-left political parties’ increased emphasis on corporate governance reform in
Germany, France, Italy, and the United States); John W. Cioffi, Governing Globalization? The
State, Law, and Structural Change in Corporate Governance, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 572 (2000)
(describing cross-national trends in the development of corporate governance regimes in the
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan).
111. In many countries, changes in market development, shareholder dispersion, and
proportions of publicly traded corporations have not been commensurate with the degree of
legal change. This gap between legal change and economic change may also undermine, or at
least require modification of, the law matters thesis and the presumption that Berle-Means
corporations, large stock markets, and high levels of equity finance are economically optimal.
Law may still matter—a lot—as an enabling factor in the market-led transformation of finance
and corporate governance, but only as part of broader institutional arrangements of the
national, and increasingly the international, political economies. In some countries with nonliberal forms of political economic organization, the broader institutional arrangements create
comparative advantages that are inconsistent with these characteristically liberal market
financial and corporate forms. See Hall & Soskice, supra note 65, at 1; Peter A. Hall & Daniel
Gingerich, Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Macroeconomy:
An Empirical Analysis (Max Planck Inst. for the Study of Societies, Discussion Paper 04/5,
2004). Thus, even when controlling for cyclical market conditions, they experience at best
modest change when laws are changed to encourage equity investment and stock market
development. Further, this great reversal in favor of markets and shareholders has now entered
a period of profound uncertainty as it confronts the grim realities of the global financial crisis
that emanated from the United States beginning in 2007 and gained catastrophic momentum
in 2008.
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constrained reform in countries where we would have least expected
them according to the legal origins theory. Common law and civil
law countries and countries from all legal families have participated
to a significant degree in this wave of pro-market and proshareholder reforms. Even if the legal origins theory had some
explanatory power with respect to past cross-national variations in
corporate governance law, those national legal frameworks have been
substantially transformed in many cases. Whether or not the legal
origins theory held through the 1980s or early 1990s becomes a
largely academic question; proliferating legal change calls the lasting
effects of legal families into question, while also continuously
undermining the current accuracy of LLSV’s coding of legal
variables.
If the path dependence logic of the legal origins theory is
rejected, the question is once again raised: does law matter? The
answer is probably a qualified yes, though the question must be
approached and answered differently depending on if it is directed at
the developed or developing countries. In the advanced industrial
countries, where the rule of law is firmly established and legal
institutions are well-developed and capacious, law almost certainly
“matters” to economic organization, practices, and outcomes
(though it likely matters and functions in ways that depart from the
simple and straightforward principal-agent, transaction costs theories
underlying the legal origins literature). In the less developed
countries, where the rule of law, legal institutions, and state capacity
are typically much weaker, differences in legal origins may well
correlate with some significant variations in finance, corporate
ownership, and economic outcomes, but these differences are more
likely the consequences of the political and institutional legacies of
colonialism, rather than variation in legal families or even
contemporary legal rules.112

112. I do not address cases in which foreign law was copied or appropriated in whole or
in part as a voluntary policy choice by the adoptive country. The politics of legal and economic
development, such as in Japan’s purported adoption of German law in the nineteenth century,
are not comparable to the colonial experience and cannot be analyzed in the same terms.
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VII. RULE OF LAW, COLONIAL LEGACIES, AND LEGAL ORIGIN AS
POLITICAL PROXY: THE DEVELOPED-DEVELOPING COUNTRY
DISTINCTION
A serious methodological problem of the legal origins theory is
the analytical treatment of developed and undeveloped countries in
the same manner. A central logical contradiction emerges as a result:
LLSV find that law matters where there is little or no effective law. If
this is not simply some spurious statistical artifact, the correlation
suggests that the relationship between legal families and economic
outcomes is not the causal effects of legal rules on behavior and
organization, but one of legal history serving as a proxy for some
other political characteristics that have a more direct influence on
financial development and forms of corporate governance.
Developing countries are particularly important for the legal origins
literature, not only because of the vital practical significance of
economic development, but also because of the relationship between
developing countries and legal families in LLSV’s research design.
Seeking to avoid endogeneity problems, the legal origins theory
looks to the legal systems of developing countries in the postcolonial era as examples of exogenous imposition.
Thus, if developing countries are not truly comparable to the
developed countries, and in particular the countries that exported
their legal systems via colonial expansion, LLSV have not addressed
the endogeneity problem they set out to solve. Rather than solving
that problem, they have created another and arguably more serious
methodological problem of comparing proverbial apples and
oranges. If the legal origins theory cannot adequately measure and
control for rule of law issues, the validity of the resultant empirical
work is undermined. After all, one of the impressive and attractive
features of the LLSV body of work is its comprehensiveness. It
covers an at times astonishing number of country cases. However, if
the methods used are not reliable to analyze the rule of law, and thus
the role of law, in many developing countries suffering from
pervasive and serious state incapacity and corruption, then the
aggregate statistical findings decline in reliability as well. Even if the
theory and analysis would work for country cases with more
developed industrialized political economies and better
institutionalized legal systems, there are relatively few rich “mother”
countries covered in the studies and many more developing countries
among their more problematic putative offspring.
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The necessity of addressing issues of enforcement in any analysis
of the effects and efficacy of law leads LLSV to include control
variables concerning the quality of government and legal
institutions.113
Both the current quality of government, including the judiciary,
and its inverse, corruption and state inefficiency, must be
incorporated into the analysis if the measures are to be anything
more than an exercise in formalism. The imposition (or in a number
of cases voluntary adoption) of a legal system based on a foreign
legal family is an element of the political history of a country and
according to LLSV their findings established it as an important
one.114 Politics and history enter into the analytical framework
through the side door, so to speak, into a theory that is essentially
non-political and not well suited to explain how or why states came
to differ in their competence, effectiveness, and integrity.
There are two fundamental problems with this approach. First,
the rule of law, quality of institutions, and even corruption are
notoriously imprecise and slippery concepts. Fierce, and likely
endless, debates revolve around the rule of law as a concept, norm,
and measure.115 Likewise, governmental quality is inherently difficult
to conceptualize, assess, and quantify. Normative disagreement over
what constitutes quality in public governance complicates the task of
conceptualization. The extraordinary complexity of state functions,
even restricting the inquiry to legal and regulatory activities directly
related to corporate governance, pose daunting measurement
problems.116 As Mathias Siems has noted, quoting Albert Einstein no
less, scholars of comparative law should “[m]ake everything as simple

113. See La Porta et al., Investor Protection, supra note 1, at 1154–58. Earlier articles raise
a number of political questions in conceptual and historical terms. See La Porta et al., Quality
of Government, supra note 1; La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, supra note 1
(shifting the focus of the legal origins analysis from corporate law to securities regulation).
114. See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 1, at 1118–19, 1126.
115. See Stephan Haggard, Andrew MacIntyre, & Lydia Tiede, The Rule of Law and
Economic Development, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 205 (2008) (review of different conceptions
and measures of the rule of law and the problems they pose for empirical and quantitative
analysis). Haggard et al. note that beyond disputes over the conceptualization of the rule of
law and its relationship to formal state institutions, informal social institutions and norms also
often inform the meaning and robustness of the rule of law in practice. Id. at 221–22. This
further complicates the problems of conceptualization and empirical analysis.
116. For a critique and partial defense of quantitative methodology applied to law and
governance, see Siems, supra note 34.
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as possible, but not simpler.”117 It is not surprising, therefore, that
the critiques of LLSV’s measures have focused on their coding and
metrics for specific substantive and procedural rules in different
countries, but have largely avoided the bramble bushes of state
capacity and integrity, along with the strength of the rule of law.
Second, leaving aside governmental competence, capacity, and
efficiency, corruption (often used as a proxy for measuring strength
of the rule of law) is both an extremely serious problem in
developing (or non-developing) countries and it is by its nature
largely hidden from view. Participants are hardly eager to disclose the
extent or means of their corruption.118 Hence, metrics of quality of
government are based on survey data based on subjective impressions
of corruption, transparency, adjudication, and enforcement.119

117. Id. at 521.
118. If they were, this would raise the interesting philosophical and jurisprudential
question of whether this activity is properly considered corrupt as opposed to an accepted,
though ultimately destructive and inefficient, form of governance. Cf. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,
BRIBES: THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF A MORAL IDEA, at xiii–xiv (1984). See generally
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978)
(premising corruption on a cultural and moral distinction between public and private spheres).
Noonan writes:
One society may be uncensorious of most reciprocities with its officeholders; there
may be no legal response to them at all, and the appearance will be given of integrity
everywhere. A different society may define bribes, legislate against bribetakers, and
prosecute bribery in such a way as to suggest that the crime is ubiquitous.
NOONAN, supra, at xiii. He goes on to note that “What is a bribe depends on the cultural
treatment of the constituent elements. The observer outside the culture, like the cynic or
rigorist within it, is inclined to see the conventional differences as arbitrary and to reduce all
reciprocities of a given kind to bribes . . . .” Id. at xiii. He therefore warns against
“reductionism that eliminates conventions and looks only at function.” Id. at xiv. As
understandable as this plea for cultural sensitivity is, corruption often does have grave
functional consequences for societies in which it becomes deeply rooted and prevalent, as
suggested by Douglas North’s diagnosis of an all-too-common suboptimal equilibrium of
societies mired in extractive and predatory economic activity that inhibits development. See
DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(1990).
119. The literature on conceptual and measurement issues with respect to corruption,
rule of law, and governance is large and rapidly growing in keeping with the increasing policy
and academic interest in public governance. See, e.g., CHRISTIANE ARNDT & CHARLES OMAN,
USES AND ABUSES OF GOVERNANCE INDICATORS (2006); MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES
OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, POWER AND DEMOCRACY (2005); JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF,
THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND REFORM: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND
POLICY (2007); Nick Duncan, The Non-Perception Based Measurement of Corruption: A
Review of Issues and Methods from a Policy Perspective, in MEASURING CORRUPTION 131
(Charles J.G. Sampford ed., 2006); Michael Johnston, Measuring the New Corruption
Rankings: Implications for Analysis and Reform, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS AND
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Perhaps this is the best we can do in grappling with the inevitable
opacity of deliberately concealed social practices, but it yields a
degree of uncertainty that is problematic in a variable so crucial to
the quantitative analysis of law’s effects and efficacy in the context of
a developing country.120
From the perspective of comparative institutional analysis, to
which the study of law can contribute much, the problems in
assessing the status of the rule of law, and levels of corruption and
state institutional capacity are stark. The “new institutionalisms” that
have had a powerful influence on the disciplines of economics,
political science, and sociology made substantial strides in including
informal norms, practices, and routines within their theoretical
frameworks. However, when corruption, state incapacity, or public
sector inefficiency so degrades governmental efficacy along with
levels of trust within society and the polity, the value of using formal
institutions—including those of law and regulation—as variables or
indicators decays as well. The rule of law presumes a distinction
between public and private, not only in theory but in practice. Yet
corruption represents the blurring of that line as private interests use
the state to appropriate rents. These conditions erode or destroy the
formal characteristics of the rule of law, and thus call into question

CONTEXT 865 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 2001); Johann Graf
Lambsdorff, Measuring Corruption—The Validity and Precision of Subjective Indicators: (CPI),
in MEASURING CORRUPTION, supra, at 81; Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo
Mastruzzi, Measuring Corruption: Myths and Realities, DEV. OUTREACH, Sept. 2006, at 124,
available
at
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corecourse2007/
Myths.pdf; Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones, Daniel Kaufmann & Mark A. Schankerman,
Measuring Governance, Corruption and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the
Business Environment in Transition Economies, (World Bank Pol’y Research Working Paper
No. 2312, 2000); Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters
IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004, (World Bank Pol’y Research Working Paper No.
3630, 2005); Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III:
Governance Indicators for 1996-2002, (World Bank Pol’y Research Working Paper No. 3106,
2003); Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Pablo Zoido-Lobatón, Aggregating Governance
Indicators (World Bank Pol’y Research Working Paper No. 2195, 1999); Dilyan Donchev &
Gergely Ujhelyi, What Do Corruption Indices Measure? (Aug. 13, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1124066). For empirical evaluations of
rule of law reform programs and analyses of the conceptual and methodological issues
involved, see BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF
LAW (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003).
120. See Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of the
Doing Business Project, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1095 (2007) (critically analyzing the World
Bank metrics of rule of law and quality of governance).
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the validity and utility of legal variables in explaining patterns of
economic behaviors and outcomes.
Likewise, the rule of law presumes that legal rules can be and are
reasonably well-enforced, but enforcement is generally practically
unavailable or ineffective where corruption is rife and where state
institutional capacities have collapsed or remain undeveloped.
Understanding political and economic practices and behavior under
such conditions may require theoretical and methodological
approaches that focus on the informal, rather than formal, attributes
of social life, such as the prevalence of clientalism inside the state and
out, the structure of patron-client networks, and the forms and
extent of state capture. “Grand corruption”121 is often (if not
typically) organized and therefore may be accurately described, at
least in some cases, as institutionalized. Although this framing of
corruption may carve out a continued and useful role for
institutional analysis, it diminishes the import of law as a constraint
on public and private behavior that is at the conceptual foundation
of the legal origins theory.
The twin problems of corruption and enforcement provide a
warning that developed and undeveloped countries often cannot be
treated analytically in the same way. Their differences in institutional
capacities and resources are simply too vast; their problems not only
vary in degree and scale, but in kind.122 Those who believe law
matters for political economic developments had best concern
themselves with how to establish the rule of law in the first place—
121. “‘Grand’ corruption refers to malfeasance of considerable magnitude by people who
exploit their positions to get rich (or become richer)—political or business leaders.” Eric M.
Uslander, Dep’t Gov’t & Politics, Univ. Md.–College Park, The Bulging Pocket and the Rule
of Law: Corruption, Inequality, and Trust, Conference Paper Presented at “The Quality of
Government: What It Is, How to Get It, Why It Matters,” The Quality of Government
Institute, Department of Political Science, Göteborg University, Göteborg, Sweden 53 (Nov.
17–19, 2005), available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/uslaner/uslanerbulging
pocketgoteborg.pdf.
122. For a comprehensive review of the empirical and theoretical literature on corruption,
law, and development, see ERIC M. USLANDER, CORRUPTION, INEQUALITY, AND THE RULE
OF LAW: THE BULGING POCKET MAKES THE EASY LIFE (2008). Uslander argues persuasively
that corruption takes root in conditions of high inequality that favor the emergence of
clientalism, and that its corrosive effect on institutional integrity and social trust perpetuates
inequality and thus corruption. Id. at 23–75. Less developed countries therefore face dilemmas
distinct from those of industrialized countries. See id. at 180–213. They are often caught in a
trap of mutually reinforcing inequality, corruption, and poverty. If they could develop
economically they might have the resources to redress inequality and escape corruption’s grip,
but corruption hinders institutional and economic development. Id. at 246–48.
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and this turns attention back towards politics and institutions.
Stephan Haggard, Andrew MacIntyre, and Lydia Tiede state the
political and institutional foundations of the rule of law succinctly:
[P]roperty rights and the integrity of contract are not simply the
result of “getting the law right” in any narrow sense. Rather,
property rights come out of a complex causal chain that includes a
variety of complementary institutions and political bargains—with
respect to security, appropriate checks on private capture of the
state, institutional checks on state power, and the more discrete
features of the judicial and legal system. In simplest form: Property
rights and contracting rest upon institutions, but these in turn rest
upon deep coalitions of consenting interests.123

It follows that legal rules, let alone legal systems, cannot be imported
or copied in some simple straightforward fashion.124 A disturbing
implication can be drawn from this acknowledgement of the
importance of politics to the development and functioning of
institutions, and institutions to the establishment and maintenance of
the rule of law. Where the appropriately constitutive politics and/or
institutions are lacking, the rule of law remains an abstraction.
Consequently, the developing and undeveloped countries may be on
fundamentally different developmental trajectories. The developed
countries are able to draw on their greater state and legal capacities
and parlay them into greater capacities for successful reform and
adaptive change. If developing countries remain mired in corruption
and underdevelopment, it is increasingly unlikely that this is because
of their membership in a given legal family, if it ever was.
The seemingly intractable problems of many developing
countries do not render comparative law irrelevant, but they do
illustrate the need to integrate the comparative legal, historical, and
political analysis in the study of economics and institutions. The
perspectives of comparative political economy and comparative law
are both essential to advance our understanding of governance and
economic organization. This is just as true of the developing world
where there is often a dearth of functional institutions and legal

123. Haggard et al., supra note 115, at 221. Haggard et al. provisionally simplify the rule
of law to the “core” of property and contract rights for purposes of their discussion of its
irreducibly political origins. Id. at 206–09, 221.
124. Id. at 221 (citing Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD 75 (Thomas Carrothers ed., 2006)).
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development as it is of the advanced industrial countries with wellestablished institutional structures and legal systems. The legal
origins literature initiated an exploration of important patterns of
legal, institutional, and economic development. We are left with a
puzzle. If legal families are not as determinative of economic
outcomes as the LLSV path dependence account suggests, what are
they measuring and what explains the variations across developed
and undeveloped countries?
VIII. LEGAL ORIGIN AS POLITICAL PROXY?
Given the current state of our knowledge, this essay ends on a
speculative note. The theoretical and empirical critiques of the legal
origins theory have substantially undermined their claims. One
possible answer to the question of what LLSV are measuring is that
they are not measuring anything and that the conceptual, logical,
and methodological flaws in the analyses lead to spurious
correlations propping up specious conclusions. The critics of the
legal origins theory have forced a reconsideration of whether specific
legal rules can explain variations in financial development, but there
do seem to be resilient patterns of variation with respect to the
relation between legal families and more easily operationalized
variables like dividends and financial market development. So it is
likely that something is being measured and some real, and apparently
systematic, variation has been detected. Without much more reliable
data and much more detailed historical research, it is difficult and
perhaps impossible to determine the cause of these variations.
If substantive law does not provide an answer, is it plausible that
legal families are actually proxies for other political factors? This is
fertile ground for further research on both colonial legacies and on
the determinants of national corporate governance regimes and
financial development, only the most general sketch of which can be
presented here. A number of possible political economic
characteristics may prove to have explanatory power. One might
construct studies to examine the influence of state institutional
structures; including parliamentary versus presidential systems, or
majoritarian versus proportional representation electoral and party
systems. Likewise, studies could analyze the complementarities and
contradictions among institutions that constitute the political
economy as a complex system. More difficult to measure are state
capacities to exercise power and govern efficiently across different
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policy domains. Finally, and perhaps most difficult to quantitatively
measure are informal power relations among elites, the influence of
informal norms in political and economic culture, corruption, and
the relative development of the rule of law.
A number of studies in the colonial legacies literature cling to the
common law-civil law distinction as the principal explanatory variable
in accounting for differential development.125 However, like the legal
origins literature proper, these studies do not sufficiently address the
potentially, perhaps likely, confounding effect of other political
variables, such as those listed in the preceding paragraph, closely
correlated with differences among colonial powers at different points
in history. Once again, the common law-civil law distinction may be
a proxy for other legacies of colonial rule and the studies do not
adequately address this possibility.
Former colonies among the developing countries offer other
political and historical characteristics for analysis as potential
contributors to developmental outcomes after independence.126 In
these countries, the legal family initially was imposed, not as an
accident of political birth, but as a mechanism of colonial rule that
may have had any of a number of different objectives. These
mechanisms ranging from brutal exploitation and resource extraction
(as in the Belgian Congo) to the creation of self-sustaining and
increasingly autonomous political and economic systems (as was the
case in Britain’s North American and Australian colonies). Yet, the
character of political authority and the structure of its political and
legal institutions, along with the primary purposes they served, varied
not only across different colonial powers, but across a single
colonizer’s territories. The manner of colonial rule is a substantial
determinant of its institutional and juridical legacies—not just the
identity of a given colonizing power, its legal tradition, or even the

125. See, e.g., Sandra Fullerton Joireman, Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of
Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy, 39 J. MOD. AFRICAN STUD. 571, 573–76 (2001); Darryl
G. Waldron, Latin America’s Colonial Legacy: The Law and Its Relationship to Economic
Development, 48 THUNDERBIRD INT’L BUS. REV. 321, 339–42 (2006).
126. See, e.g., Grazilla Bertocchi & Fabio Canova, Did Colonization Matter for Growth?
An Empirical Exploration into the Historical Causes of Africa’s Underdevelopment, 46 EUR.
ECON. REV. 1851 (2002); Gustav Hansson, What Determines Rule of Law? An Empirical
Investigation of Rival Models, 62 KYKLOS 371 (2009) (review and econometric testing of
competing theories of the determinants of the rule of law).
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degree of its control over a territory.127 Legal families may function as
proxies of varying strength for the identity of the colonial ruler, the
degree to which its political and legal institutions were replicated in
the territory, or whether the colonial institutions were primarily
extractive or devised to build up a self-sustaining local political and
economic system.128
IX. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the intensive criticism of the legal origins
theory and its empirical findings, the legal origins theory has
significantly influenced the study of finance, corporate governance,
and their cross-national variation. Indeed, these criticisms reflect the

127. Cf. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James Robinson, The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001)
(testing the hypothesis that extractive colonization produced enduring post-colonial legacies
inimical to economic growth).
128. See generally JONATHAN TABOR KRIECKHAUS, DICTATING DEVELOPMENT: HOW
EUROPE SHAPED THE GLOBAL PERIPHERY (2006); Michael Bernhard, Christopher Reenock &
Timothy Nordstrom, The Legacy of Western Overseas Colonialism on Democratic Survival, 48
INT’L STUD. Q. 225 (2004) (arguing that the legacy of specific colonial powers continues to
have an important effect on survival of democratic regimes); Robin Grier, Colonial Legacies
and Economic Growth, 98 PUB. CHOICE, 317 (1999) (comparing effects of differing colonial
policies in former British and French Colonies in Africa); Robin Grier, The Effect of Religion on
Economic Development: A Cross National Study of 63 Former Colonies, 50 KYKLOS 47 (1997)
(examining the theory that prevailing religious thought has affected economic growth in
former British and Spanish colonies in Latin America); Hansson, supra note 126; Gregory N.
Price, Economic Growth in a Cross-section of Nonindustrial Countries: Does Colonial Heritage
Matter for Africa?, 7 REV. DEV. ECON. 478, 478–95 (2003) (suggesting that extractive
colonial policies account for a portion of the growth gap between former colonies in SubSaharan Africa and other nonindustrial countries). These alternative theories of the origins of
law and governance produce a proliferation of variables, in addition to legal families, that can
be incorporated into empirical analysis, including (1) the identity of the colonial power
(including religious heritage), (2) the degree to which the colony was settled by immigrants
from the colonizing power (and the indigenous population killed or displaced), (3) the
political and governance structures (e.g., bureaucracies, courts, legislatures) and policies (e.g.,
general and legal education, physical infrastructure, etc.) introduced during colonialization, (4)
the exercise of direct or indirect rule, (5) the timing of initial colonization, (6) the duration of
colonization, (7) the manner of achieving independence, and (8) the time elapsed since
independence. Of course, data availability, comparability, and quality are a problem in
grappling with these variables and may require the use of proxy variables. See Acemoglu et al.,
supra note 127, at 1370, 1374–75 (using high settler mortality as a proxy for the imposition of
highly extractive forms of colonial organization and rule); Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones,
Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?, 114 Q.J.
ECON. 83 (1999) (using latitude and the fraction of the population speaking a European
language as proxies for the extent of Western European influence on colonial and post-colonial
society and polity).

1549

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/10/2010 12:48 PM

2009

fact that they were among the first to attempt such wide-ranging
studies of the relationship between law and finance, and because they
were so successful in articulating, deepening, and expanding a welldefined research agenda that leveraged the intellectual appeal and
policy influence of microeconomic theory and econometrics. This
has had a salutary effect on comparative legal and economic research
in that the legal origins literature has provided important evidence
regarding cross-national variations in law and financial systems, and
helped to shed light on the relationships between them. The
revisions to LLSV’s metrics and scoring may produce new findings
that are illuminating, unexpected, and robust.
Even in its flaws, the legal origins literature has inspired scholars
of comparative law, economics, and politics to look at corporate
governance and financial systems in a broader frame of reference
that, for all of its many challenges and limitations, is increasingly
important in an era of international financial markets and legal
reform. The contention that law matters was salutary at a time when
private ordering captivated many in academic and policy circles. The
import of law may be better made through more qualitative and
historically grounded research, but well-designed and carefully
executed quantitative studies can provide valuable, if partial, insights
into broad patterns of legal, institutional, and economic organization
and development. An extraordinary range of scholars who have
followed their lead into related research areas owe LLSV a debt of
gratitude for that even if they depart from the path of legal origins
and leave the theory and its conclusions behind them.
On the other hand, legal origins theory have not been as
successful in elucidating the development of law and legal
institutions, or in enhancing our understanding of the operation of
particular national corporate governance regimes. The quantitative
analyses marshaled in its support have been crippled by theoretical
and methodological limitations. It is strikingly ironic that LLSV’s
legal origins work, while premised on, and devoted to, empirically
corroborating the proposition that law matters, should treat law in
such a highly reductionist fashion. Indeed, LLSV have reduced law
to such an extent that they find that legal family of origin matters in
contexts where the rule of law itself is exceedingly weak. This
suggests both a methodological problem of treating dissimilar cases
alike in ways that tend to generate logically questionable or spurious
findings, and deeper theoretical problems of excessive formalism and
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functionalism, common to much economic theory and analysis.
These deeper problems lose sight of the complexity of substantive
and procedural law, and the institutional arrangements in which they
are situated and that determine their effectiveness and practical
import.
Large-n quantitative analysis is bedeviled by a trade-off: what is
gained in range and scope useful to discern broad patterns in
variation is lost in empirical detail and richness that permits us to
understand how legal systems function as part of the broader
political economy and the causal channels that drive the
development of law and institutions over time. The abstract
universality and ahistorical character of the functional categories and
variables expand the theory’s reach and generalizability of its
findings, but become a weakness when the empirical analysis elides
substantial changes in national legal and financial systems. Further,
the highly deterministic and path dependent logic of the legal origins
theory is in tension with global political and juridical trends towards
substantial reform of corporate governance and securities market
regulation during the past twenty-five years. The theory offers a
comparative statics relationship between specific types of legal rules
to increased financial development when recent history and current
events call for a dynamic theory of institutional and juridical change.
The legal origins theory also tends to homogenize the country
cases, failing to distinguish adequately among country cases with
respect to differences in rule of law and institutional arrangements,
while universalizing the normative implications and prescriptions
derived from the studies. Developed and less developed countries
cannot be subject to identical forms of analysis without distorting the
findings. Colonial legacies and persistent power imbalances within
the international system cannot be ignored or reduced to differences
in legal origins. There is a notable bias in the framing of quality of
law in the LLSV literature that favors pro-shareholder legal rules and
higher levels of financial development. The theory tends to support
the adoption of “high quality” legal rules regardless of local legal,
institutional, or political conditions as a means of securing growth of
equities markets and financial system development. After the collapse
of the global financial system and the role of international markets in
transmitting the crisis cross-nationally, this sanguine view of finance
and markets is due for a searching reappraisal.
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These limitations point to the potential value-added of
institutionalist theories and more fine-grained qualitative and
historically grounded empirical research to the study of the
relationships among law, finance, and politics. Qualitative political
and institutional analysis, along with traditional legal scholarship,
takes seriously the political and juridical dimensions of financial
systems and corporate governance regimes and can fill in the wide
gaps—and correct the occasional distortions—left by economic
theory and econometric analysis. By all means, the large-n analysis of
these phenomena should be continued. Let a hundred scholarly
flowers bloom, and do not mistake the vast size of the garden
through intellectual blinders.
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